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Federalism in the Era of International
Standards: Federal and State Government
Regulation of Merchant Vessels in the United
States (Part II)*
CRAIG H. ALLEN**
IV
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON MERCHANT VESSEL
ACCESS AND SAFETY STANDARDS
The modem legal regime governing merchant vessel safety and pollution
prevention is now dominated by international agreements. Exercising its
foreign affairs powers, the United Sates has entered into a multitude of
international conventions, treaties, and agreements which together establish
the terms of foreign merchant vessel access to United States ports and waters
and the construction, design, equipment, manning, and operational rules and
standards with which those vessels must comply as a condition of entry. In
most cases the international conventions also establish the safety and
pollution prevention standards with which United States flag vessels must
comply under domestic law and as a condition of entry into the ports or
waters of other nations. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (LOS Convention), examined below, provides the overall framework
for this international marine safety and pollution prevention regime.
*Editor's Note: This is the second part of a multi-part article. Part III will appear in the January 1999
issue of the Journal. Part I appeared in the July 1998 issue of the Journal and examined the constitutional
allocation of federal and state powers relevant to the regulation of merchant vessel safety and
vessel-source pollution prevention and described the constitutional limitations on the states' exercise of
their police powers.
**Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Law and Marine Affairs, University of Washington
(Seattle). J.D., University of Washington.
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A. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: The
Framework
The LOS Convention,384 which entered into force in 1994, has been
acclaimed by many as the most comprehensive international law project ever
completed. Although President Reagan declared in 1983 that most of the
Convention's provisions codified customary international law, 385 which the
United States would follow, the United States refused to sign the Conven-
tion, citing objections to its deep seabed mining regime. In 1994, after the
United Nations General Assembly approved an agreement amending the
seabed mining provisions of the Convention, President Clinton presented the
Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent. 386
The LOS Convention imposes an obligation on all States to protect and
preserve the marine environment. 387 The Convention provides a flexible
international framework within which existing or subsequently-enacted
treaties governing vessel safety and marine environmental protection may be
implemented globally. 388 It expressly requires all States to cooperate on a
384Entered into force Nov. 16, 1994, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982),
and in 6B Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 10-6 (7th rev. ed. 1997).385See Statement by the President on the Convention of the Law of the Sea, 18 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Docs. 887 (1982); Statement Accompanying Proclamation of Exclusive Economic Zone, 19 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Docs. 383 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 464 (1983); see also Charney, U.S. Provisional
Application of the 1994 Deep Seabed Agreement, 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 705 (1994); Moore, Customary
International Law After the Convention, in The Developing Order of the Oceans 41, 43 (R. Krueger &
S. Risenfeld eds. 1984) (opining that, except for its seabed and dispute resolution articles, and in the
absence of contrary State practice, the 1982 LOS Convention is the best evidence of customary
international law); Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States, pt. V intro, note at
5-9. For a scholarly comment criticizing the conclusion reached by the Restatement Reporter see Burke,
Customary Law of the Sea: Advocacy or Disinterested Scholarship?, 14 Yale J. Int'l L. 508, 509-12
(1989).386The President forwarded the Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent on October 7,
1994. President's Message to Congress Transmitting United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
with Annexes, Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. 103-39, 103d Cong. (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1309
(1995); Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 89 Am. J. Int'l
L. 96, 112-15 (1995). One federal court, citing Articles 18 and 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, recently held that "[a]lthough the [LOS Convention] is currently pending ratification before
the Senate, it nevertheless carries the weight of law from the date of its submission by the President to
the Senate." United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 96-0333, slip op. at 7 (D.P.R. Sept. 19,
1997) (ruling that the United States is precluded by Article 230 of the LOS Convention from imposing
any punishment other than monetary penalties against a foreign vessel for the discharge of oil in the
United States territorial sea).
387LOS Convention art. 192 ("States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment."); see also Boyle, Marine Pollution Under The Law of the Sea Convention, 79 Am. J. Int'l
L. 347 (1985).388See LOS Convention art. 237. Similarly, the principal international conventions on marine safety
and pollution prevention include provisions "saving" the legal effect of the LOS Convention. See, e.g.,
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, T.I.A.S. No. 10561; 1978 Tanker
Safety and Pollution Prevention Protocol (MARPOL), reprinted in 17 1.L.M. 546 (1978), entered into
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regional and global basis, directly or through competent international
organizations, to formulate international rules and standards to prevent,
reduce, and control pollution from vessels.389 By establishing general
guidelines within which the community of nations may prescribe more
detailed rules and standards, and requiring all States to work toward
development of international standards, the LOS Convention permits the
international legal regime for merchant vessel safety and protection of the
marine environment to evolve, as it must if it is to meet changing
environmental needs and take advantage of new technologies.
In addressing the problem of vessel-source pollution the Convention
allocates jurisdiction and responsibility for prescribing and enforcing vessel
safety and pollution prevention rules and standards among flag States,390
coastal States, 391 and port States. 392 The Convention devotes substantial
attention to vessel-source pollution and the various roles of respective States
in prescribing and enforcing rules to prevent such pollution.393 How that
responsibility is allocated has become a subject of lively debate, both in the
context of the LOS Convention, and under contemporary State practice. As
the following sections will describe more fully, the principal responsibility
for enforcing vessel-source pollution regulations lies with the flag State.394
Coastal States are granted jurisdiction to prescribe laws consistent with
international rules and standards and to enforce those laws against foreign
vessels in order to protect their adjacent marine environment. 395 Coastal
State jurisdiction over foreign flag vessels is most extensive when the vessel
voluntarily enters a port or an offshore terminal in the coastal State. Under
these circumstances, the "port State" may even regulate a foreign vessel's
design and construction standards, 396 subject to any applicable port State
force Oct. 2, 1983, art. 9(2); Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW
Convention), art. V(4), S. Treaty Doc. No. 96-1, C.T.I.A. No. 7624, entered into force Apr. 28, 1984.
389LOS Convention art. 211(1).
39°As used in the Convention, the "flag State" is the State which grants to a vessel her nationality,
registration, or the right to fly the State's flag.39 1A "coastal State" is the State adjacent to an area of water over which it exercises some level of
jurisdiction or control with respect to the waters and vessels within those waters.392With respect to regulating vessels, "port States" are distinguished from coastal States by the fact
that the vessel involved has voluntarily entered a port or offshore terminal or the internal waters of the
State.
393The 1982 LOS Convention does little to address standards for prescribing or enforcing pollution
liability measures, such as requirements for certificates of financial liability. See art. 229 ("Nothing in
this Convention affects the institution of civil proceedings in respect of any claim for loss or damage
resulting from pollution of the marine environment."); art. 235 (States shall cooperate in implementation
and development of international law relating to compensation and compulsory insurance.).
394Id. art. 217.
395Id. art. 220.
1961d. art. 211(3) & (4).
October 1998
568 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
control provisions in governing safety and pollution prevention conventions
or in port access treaties to which the port State is a party.
1. Flag State Role in Vessel Safety and Pollution Prevention
The LOS Convention reaffirms the long-established principle that primary
responsibility for regulating vessel safety and pollution prevention lies with
the vessel's flag State. 397 Along with the right to grant national registry to
ships398 comes the correlative international duty to take adequate measures
to ensure that those vessels meet standards that are at least as strict as the
generally accepted international standards designed to promote marine
safety and prevent pollution. 399 Article 94 of the Convention requires flag
States to take measures to ensure safety at sea with regard to: 1) the
construction, equipment, and seaworthiness of ships; 2) the manning of
ships, labor conditions, and training of crews, taking into account the
international instruments; and, 3) the use of signals, the maintenance of
communications, and the prevention of collisions.
Flag States must adopt national laws and regulations to prevent or control
vessel-source pollution which are at least as strict as internationally accepted
standards, 40 0 and they must enforce both the international standards and their
own laws and regulations.40 1 Flag States must verify compliance with
relevant marine safety standards both before granting a vessel her registra-
tion and periodically thereafter. 40 2 Verification is to be performed through
inspections by qualified surveyors. Certificates attesting to compliance must
be issued to the vessel. Flag States must also ensure that their vessels carry
adequate charts, publications, and navigational equipment, and that each
vessel is in the charge of a competent master and officers who are fully
conversant in applicable international regulations concerning the safety of
life at sea, collision prevention, and pollution reduction, prevention, and
control. 40 3 These "framework" requirements are extensively supplemented
by a number of more detailed conventions examined in section IV-C below.
3971d. arts. 94 & 217; see generally Restatement, supra note 385, at § 502.398LOS Convention art. 91; Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584, 1953 AMC 1210 (1953).399LOS Convention arts. 94(5) & 217 ("States shall ensure compliance by vessels flying their flag or
of their registry with applicable international rules and standards, established through the competent
international organization or general diplomatic conference, and with their laws and regulations adopted
in accordance with this Convention for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution of the marine
environment from vessels.").4
°°1d. art. 211(2).
4°ld. art. 217(1).
4°21d. arts. 94(4)(a) & 213(3).
4
°
31d. art. 92(4)(b).
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2. The Coastal State's Role in Vessel Safety and Pollution Prevention
The LOS Convention significantly extends the coastal State's influence
and control over its adjacent waters. It provides for recognition of a
territorial sea up to twelve nautical miles in breadth, 4° 4 and contiguous zones
of up to twenty-four miles.40 5 Within its territorial sea a coastal State has
jurisdiction to prescribe regulations for the prevention, reduction, and
control of marine pollution from foreign vessels, including vessels exercis-
ing the right of innocent passage.40 6 Coastal States may also adopt laws
consistent with generally accepted international rules and standards and
apply them to vessels navigating in their exclusive economic zone.407 If a
coastal State believes that the international standards are inadequate to
protect a clearly defined area of particular ecological sensitivity within its
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), it may apply to the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) for authorization to adopt special mandatory measures
for prevention of vessel pollution within the area.408 Those measures, if
approved by the IMO, may exceed international standards. 40 9
The LOS Convention draws a distinction between a coastal State's
regulation of vessels transiting its territorial seas to enter the State's internal
waters or ports and those transiting the territorial sea in innocent passage,
bound for sea, or for another nation's port.410 For vessels in the former
category, the coastal State has jurisdiction to take any necessary steps to
prevent a breach of the conditions of port entry.41' The coastal State is more
restricted in the regulations it may impose on foreign vessels in innocent
4°4Id. art. 3. By Presidential Proclamation in 1988 the United States extended its territorial sea claim
to twelve nautical miles-for international law purposes. Proclamation 5928, 3 C.F.R. § 547 (1988). For
most domestic statutes, however, the territorial sea is still defined as extending only three nautical miles.
Early legislative proposals which would have extended domestic jurisdiction to twelve nautical miles
failed to pass. See, e.g., H.R. 3842, 102d Cong. (1991) (The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
Extension and Enforcement Act of 1991) & H.R. 536, 102d Cong. (1991) (informally known as the
Coastal States Extension Act of 1991). Congress extended federal criminal jurisdiction to twelve nautical
miles in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 901, 110 Stat. 1214, 1317 (1996); however, the effect of this extension is not yet clear. See United
States v. One Big Six Wheel, 987 F. Supp. 169, 1998 AMC 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the
AEDPA did not extend application of the Gambling Ship Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1083). Consideration
for extension of other federal statutes to the limits of the twelve mile territorial sea resurfaced in the 105th
Congress. See H.R. 2204, 105th Cong. (1997) (Coast Guard Authorization Bill, which would extend
geographic reach of certain statutes to twelve nautical miles).4 05LOS Convention art. 33.
406Id. art. 211(4). Such laws shall not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels.40 7Id. art. 211(5).
4 08d. art. 211(6).
4 09See also MARPOL Annex I, reg. 10 (establishing prohibition on discharges in "special areas").
4 1
°LOS Convention art. 25; see generally Restatement, supra note 385, at §§ 512-513.
41LOS Convention art. 25(2).
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passage in its territorial sea, 4 12 or on vessels exercising the right of "transit
passage" through an international strait.413 Such laws shall not apply to the
construction, design, equipment, and manning (commonly referred to as
"CDEM" standards) of foreign ships, unless they are giving effect to
generally accepted international standards. 41 4 The LOS Convention does
not, however, limit the coastal State's jurisdiction to establish stricter
discharge and liability standards to vessels in transit through the territorial
sea, so long as those requirements are non-discriminatory and do not hamper
innocent passage.4t 5
The Convention recognizes that coastal States may establish sea-lanes and
traffic separation schemes within their territorial sea.416 Tankers and vessels
carrying inherently dangerous or noxious substances can be required to
confine their transit to such lanes. Coastal State jurisdiction over civil and
criminal matters occurring on board foreign vessels passing through their
territorial sea is circumscribed by the Convention.4 17 A coastal State's
jurisdiction over vessels in transit through its EEZ is limited to enforcing
generally accepted international rules and standards for the prevention,
412See id. art. 21. Under domestic United States law, the President may suspend innocent passage
during a national emergency. 50 C.F.R. § 191.413LOS Convention arts. 37-44; see also Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 28.414LOS Convention art. 21(2). Specific mention of construction, design, equipment, and manning
standards was new with the 1982 Convention. Cf. International Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, art. 17, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639 (1958) ("Foreign ships exercising the right
of innocent passage shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal State in conformity
with these articles and other rules of international law and, in particular, with such laws and regulations
relating to transport and navigation.").415See LOS Convention art. 24(l). If the coastal State is a party to another pollution liability
convention it may, however, be limited by the terms of that convention. The two principal international
conventions on liability for marine pollution are the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (CLC), entered into force Jun. 19, 1975, 973 U.N.T.S. No. 14097, reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
45 (1970), and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution (Fund Convention), entered into force Oct. 16, 1978, reprinted in I 1
I.L.M. 284 (1972). The history of both conventions is traced in 3 Benedict on Admiralty ch. 9,
§§ 116-117 (7th rev. ed. 1997).416LO5 Convention art. 22. The United States has adopted certain shipping safety fairways (33 C.F.R.
pt. 166) and offshore traffic separation schemes (33 C.F.R. pt. 167).
4 17 LO5 Convention art. 27 (criminal jurisdiction) & art. 28 (civil jurisdiction). The United States'
procedures for consular officers are codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 256-258; see also Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, entered into force Mar. 19, 1967, T.I.A.S. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. Although under
customary international law port States may-unless otherwise agreed to by treaty between the flag State
and port State-exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction over non-public vessels voluntarily in their ports
and internal waters, Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 124 (1923), as a matter of international
comity they usually refrain from doing so unless the offense disturbs the peace of the port. In re
Wildenhus, 120 U.S. 1, 12 (1887). Jurisdiction is even more limited where the alleged crime occurred on
the high seas. See LOS Convention art. 97; International Convention on Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of
Collision, May 10, 1952, 439 U.N.T.S. 233. But see S.S. Lotus, P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10 (1927) (upholding
Turkish criminal jurisdiction over French vessel officer following collision on the high seas).
Vol. 29, No. 4
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reduction, and control of pollution from vessels or laws and regulations of
the coastal State conforming or giving effect to such rules and standards. 418
The coastal State's authority is greatest with respect to ships within its
ports. In fact the port State's role respecting safety of foreign vessels is not
entirely permissive. The LOS Convention imposes a "duty to detain" on
States other than flag States which, upon request or on their own initiative,
have ascertained that a foreign vessel within one of their ports is in violation
of applicable international rules and standards relating to seaworthiness of
vessels and thereby threatens damage to the marine environment. 419 Under
such circumstances the port State must take administrative measures to
prevent the vessel from sailing. Parties to the International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 420 have a similar duty to "intervene," in
order to prevent a foreign vessel from sailing until the crew corrects any
unseaworthy conditions. 42'
In 1982, when the LOS Convention was opened for signature, certificates
of inspection valid on their face were widely accepted as conclusive
evidence of a vessel's compliance with the applicable international stan-
dards. Port States wishing to verify compliance with international marine
safety standards are therefore initially limited by the LOS Convention to an
examination of the vessel's certificates, records, and documents. 422 Actual
physical inspection of vessels carrying valid certificates is authorized under
the LOS Convention only when the port State has "clear grounds for
believing" that the condition of the vessel does not correspond substantially
with the particulars of the documents.423 Notwithstanding the deference
accorded flag State certificates under the LOS Convention, many nations-
including the United States-are growing increasingly reluctant to accept
those certificates without question, particularly certificates from so-called
open registry nations, or nations whose vessel or owner safety records or
government-approved classification society statistics indicate serious defi-
ciencies in inspection practices or a larger than expected number of
418LOS Convention art. 220(3).
4191d. art. 219. The State may permit the vessel to proceed to the nearest repair yard, and upon removal
of the causes of the violation shall permit the vessel to proceed.42
°International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No.
9700; Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 32
U.S.T. 5577, T.I.A.S. 10009 (a 1988 Protocol, S. Treaty Doc. No. 2, 102d Cong., at 83 (1991)), is not
yet in force).4 211d. ch. I, reg. 19(c) (requiring detention for unseaworthy conditions) & ch. XI, reg. 4 (requiring
detention if vessel's master or crew is not familiar with "essential shipboard procedures relating to the
safety of ships").4 22LOS Convention art. 226.
42 3Id. This standard is consistent with existing international agreements.
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substandard vessels.424 The reluctant answer for many nations is port State
control.
3. The Role of Port States in Vessel Safety and Pollution Prevention
Under customary international law a State's jurisdiction over its internal
waters is equivalent to the State's jurisdiction over its land territory.425
Accordingly, coastal States have broad jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce
regulations governing foreign, non-public vessels within their internal
waters. Supplementing and modifying this principle of customary interna-
tional law, at least seven IMO-sponsored conventions contain provisions for
port State enforcement that are in some respects more restrictive than the
rules of customary international law.426 The IMO-sponsored conventions
(discussed below in section IV-C) establish international vessel safety and
pollution prevention standards and confer varying degrees of control
authority on port States. Generally speaking each convention requires flag
States to adopt and enforce standards at least as stringent as those established
by the convention, and to issue such vessels certificates confirming their
compliance with those standards. Valid certificates must be accepted by port
States as evidence of compliance with the convention standards unless there
are clear grounds for believing that the actual condition of the ship or her
equipment does not correspond substantially with the conditions reflected in
the certificates. 427 Beyond these general common features, several differ-
ences exist among the conventions. For example, the SOLAS Convention
confines port State remedial measures to non-punitive interventions or
detentions. 428 By contrast, the 1973 International Convention for Prevention
4 24 For years, the term "substandard" was not defined adequately under the applicable conventions or
port State control protocols. See, e.g., IMO Res. A.466 (XII), A.542(13) & A.597(15). As a result, the
label is occasionally assigned under circumstances where it is unwarranted. Partly to remedy the
too-common solecisms, the IMO Flag State Implementation Subcommittee consolidated the IMO Port
State Control resolutions into a single document, which defines the criteria under which a vessel may be
classified "substandard." See IMO Res. A.787(19). The new Resolution adds guidance on detention of
vessels, qualification, and training requirements for port State control officers, and procedures for port
State control boardings.
42511 D. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea 848 (1984); United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S.
11, 22-23, 1969 AMC 1019 (1969) (footnotes omitted); LOS Convention art. 2(l) (affirming State
sovereignty over its internal waters); Restatement, supra note 385, §§ 511 cmt. e & 512 cmt. c. The
authorities are analyzed in Restatement § 512 n.3.
4 26These include the 1966 International Convention on Load Lines, the 1969 International Convention
on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, the 1972 International Convention for Safe Containers, the 1973
International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships (and its 1978 Protocol), the 1974
SOLAS Convention (and its 1978 Protocol), the 1977 Torremolinos Convention for Safety of Fishing
Vessels, and the 1978 STCW Convention.
427See, e.g., SOLAS ch. I, reg. 19(b); MARPOL art. 5.
428SOLAS ch. I, regs. 12 & 19. Under the United States Port State Control Initiative, the usual
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of Pollution from Ships and its 1978 Protocol (MARPOL) permit the port
State not only to board foreign vessels to confirm compliance with
MARPOL, but to also take enforcement action against vessels found to be
in violation of the convention. 429 Both conventions require port States to
avoid unduly delaying a ship, and call for compensation by the port State for
any loss or damage suffered as a result of an undue delay or detention. 430
The Supreme Court examined the scope of port State authority under
international law and the laws of the United States in Cunard S.S. Co. v.
Mellon.431 The case concerned a challenge to application of the Volstead
Amendment to British flag vessels while in United States ports or waters.
Justice Van Devanter's majority opinion began by declaring that it was
settled under domestic and international law that United States sovereign
control extended not only to its land territories but also to its ports, harbors,
bays, and territorial sea. 432 With respect to vessels in those waters, the Court
articulated both the rule of jurisdiction and the principle of comity, holding
that:
A merchant ship of one country voluntarily entering another subjects herself to
the jurisdiction of the latter .... Of course, the local sovereign may out of
considerations of public policy choose to forego the exertion of its jurisdiction
or to exert the same in only a limited way, but this is a matter resting solely
in its discretion. 433
Most of the leading IMO-sponsored conventions contain such voluntary
limitations on port State control authority. The LOS Convention's "frame-
work" port State authority and control articles434 closely follow existing
provisions of the SOLAS Convention.435 The LOS Convention imposes no
restrictions on States to inspect foreign merchant vessels in their ports to
practice is to notify the flag State of any deficiencies and request that the flag State dispatch a qualified
surveyor to verify that the condition has been corrected.4 29MARPOL art. 5.4301d. art. 7; SOLAS ch. I, reg. 19(f).
41'262 U.S. 100 (1923).
432 1d. at 122.
4331d. at 124.
434Some commentators have questioned whether all of the 1982 LOS Convention articles on marine
pollution and port State enforcement have the status of customary international law, and would therefore
bind even States not party to the LOS Convention. See, e.g., Vallarta, Protection and Preservation of the
Marine Environment and Marine Scientific Research at the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 46
Law & Contemp. Probs. 147, 152 (1983); Degan, Internal Waters, 17 Neth. Y.B. Int'l L. 27 (1986)
(concluding that it is not yet certain whether article 218 of the LOS Convention has attained customary
international law status).43 SOLAS ch. 1, reg. 19. The United States Coast Guard sponsored changes to SOLAS ch. I,
regulation 19 following the Argo Merchant oil spill and the spate of tanker casualties that followed in the
late 1970s. At the same time, the Coast Guard sponsored the 1978 Tanker Safety and Pollution
Prevention Protocol to the MARPOL 73 Convention. See H. Rep. No. 95-1384, pt. I, at 8-9 (1978),
October 1998
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determine if they are in compliance with applicable international rules and
standards relating to seaworthiness of vessels. As earlier discussed, i f a
vessel is not in compliance, and her unseaworthiness threatens damage to the
marine environment, the coastal State has a duty to prevent the vessel from
sailing until the condition is corrected. This aspect of "port State control"
over foreign vessels has evolved rapidly in the years since the LOS
Convention was drafted.436
Dissatisfied with the efforts by some flag States to ensure that vessels
flying their flag comply with the applicable IMO conventions, most of the
key port States of the world have entered into regional agreements which
call for inspection by member States, as port States, of 25% or more of all
arriving foreign merchant vessels.437 The more than sixty nations partici-
pating in the Paris MOU of 1978,438 the Latin American Agreement of
1992,4 3 9 the Asia-Pacific MOU of 1993,440 the Caribbean Region MOU of
1996, 44t and the Mediterranean Region MOU of 199744 2 have embarked on
ambitious port State control programs designed to ensure foreign vessels
calling at their ports meet minimum international standards for safety and
protection of the marine environment.443 While no nation yet advocates
anything approaching a complete transfer of vessel control authority from
flag States to port States, the growing prominence of port State control
programs is perhaps the single most significant development in merchant
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3270, 3276-77. This demand for an expansion of port State authority
was carried into the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, which drafted the 1982 LOS Convention.436Compare IMO Procedures for the Control of Ships (Nov. 19, 1981), reprinted in 6E Benedict on
Admiralty, Doc. No. 14-18 (7th rev. ed. 1997), with IMO Resolution A.742(18) (1993) (authorizing port
State inspections to ensure crews are able to carry out essential shipboard marine pollution prevention
procedure) and SOLAS ch. XI, reg. 4 (expanded control procedures effective in 1996).437 Plaza, Port State Control: Towards Global Standardization, IMO News 1:1994, at 13-20; IMO Res.
A.682(17) (regional cooperation in the control of ships and discharges).438Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in Implementing Agreements on Maritime
Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment, Mar. 2, 1978, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1 (1982), and in
6E Benedict on Admiralty Doc. No. 14-20 (7th rev. ed. 1997). The original MOU was recently
superseded and extended to all members of the European Union by the European Union Council
Directive on Port State Control, which entered into force on July 1, 1996 (95/21/EC, June 19, 1995).439Acuerdo de Vina del Mar, Nov. 5, 1993, reprinted in 6E Benedict on Admiralty Doc. No. 14-21
(7th rev. ed. 1997).
"Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region, Dec. 2, 1993,
reprinted in 6E Benedict on Admiralty Doc. No. 14-22 (7th rev. ed. 1997).
441Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Caribbean Region, done Feb. 9, 1996,
reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 237 (1997), and in 6C Benedict on Admiralty Doc. No. 14-23 (7th rev. ed. 1997).
442Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Malta, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey signed the Mediterranean
MOU in Valletta, Malta on July 11, 1997. Other Mediterranean maritime authorities, which meet the
criteria stipulated in the Memorandum, such as Lebanon and Libya, may join the agreement at a later
date.
443See generally G. Kasoulides, Port State Control and Jurisdiction: Evolution of the Port State
Regime ch. 6 (1993).
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vessel safety in the past decade. Two recent developments portend continued
growth of these programs. The first is the expanded scope of boardings.
Recent amendments to the SOLAS and MARPOL conventions now ex-
pressly provide for port State authority to evaluate foreign vessel "opera-
tional requirements," including crew performance. 44  Parties to the Paris
MOU recently agreed to extend port State inspections to include operational
requirements and an assessment of equipment and crew performance by
drills.445 The impetus for extending port State inspections to include crew
performance lies in findings that point to human error as the cause of 80%
or more of all marine casualties." 6
4. Procedural Safeguards and Dispute Resolution under the LOS
Convention
The LOS Convention establishes a number of safeguards for foreign flag
vessels subject to enforcement measures by coastal States, to guard against
abusive investigative practices, unreasonable detentions, or hearing proce-
dures that are fundamentally unfair.447 Coastal States that violate the
Convention's safeguards may be liable for any resulting damages or losses
suffered by the vessel. 448 Claims against coastal States for failing to release
vessels and their crews promptly are subject to the Convention's provisions
for compulsory dispute settlement if both the port State and the flag State are
parties to the Convention.449 A coastal State may also apply to a dispute
settlement tribunal for "provisional measures" (akin to a temporary restrain-
ing order), to prevent serious harm to the marine environment. 450 Such
provisional measures may include further detention of the vessel.
44SOLAS ch. XI, reg. 4; MARPOL Annex I, reg. 4A. These provisions, sponsored by the Flag State
Implementation Subcommittee of the IMO's Maritime Safety Committee, entered into force in 1996.
SOLAS ch. XI, reg. 4. See also IMO Resolution A.742(18) (1993), which permits port State inspections
to ensure crews are able to carry out essential shipboard marine pollution prevention procedure.
445See Paris MOU, supra note 438.
446See Card, Prevention through People, 52 Proc. Mar. Safety Council No. 3, at 1 (May-June 1995).
A 1976 study placed the figure at 85%. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,766 (1976) (proposed Navigation Safety Rules).
447LOS Convention arts. 223-231.
4481d. art. 232. The nation may also be liable under other relevant conventions. See, e.g., MARPOL
art. 7(2).
449LOS Convention art. 292. The first case decided by the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea arose under this article. See M/V Saiga (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), 37 I.L.M. 360
(1997). Until it becomes a party to the LOS Convention, the United States may not take advantage of its
dispute settlement procedures. Interestingly, the United States Senate rejected the optional compulsory
dispute settlement protocol, which accompanied the 1958 conventions on the law of the sea. See 12 M.
Whiteman, Digest of International Law 1333 (1971).4 50LOS Convention art. 290.
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B. International Agreements Establishing Terms of Access to United
States Ports and Waterways
Ready access to foreign ports is vital to maritime trade and transporta-
tion.45 t The LOS Convention establishes a regime for foreign vessel
navigation through a nation's territorial sea or through waters forming an
international strait, but does not address directly the terms of foreign vessel
access to a nation's internal waters or ports. Although there is authority for
the proposition that customary international law requires that the ports of
every State be open to foreign merchant vessels, and that ports may only be
closed when the vital interests of the State so require, 452 the weight of
authority is to the contrary. 453 Nevertheless, within the United States this
important principle has been voluntarily implemented through a number of
treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN treaties). 454 Merchant
vessel access under an FCN treaty is not completely unrestricted. For
example, the President may suspend commercial privileges of vessels whose
flag State discriminates against United States vessels. 455 And the right of
port access, even under an FCN treaty, does not carry with it immunity from
regulations by the port nation. 456 The United States may and does require
45 1M. McDougal & W. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 99-100 (1987).
452Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 27 I.L.M. 117, 212 (1963); contra
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), 14 I.C.J. I 11 (1986) (holding that states enjoy sovereign right to control access to ports); see also
International Convention and Statute Concerning Regime of Maritime Ports, done Dec. 9, 1923, 58
L.N.T.S. 285, reprinted in 6E Benedict on Admiralty, Doc. No. 18A-6, art. 2 (7th rev. ed. 1997). The
United States is not a party to the Maritime Ports Convention.453See United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 22-23, 1969 AMC 1019 (1969); Burke, supra note
385, at 520-22; McDorman, Port State Enforcement: A Comment on Article 218 of the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention, 28 J. Mar. L. & Com. 305 (1997).454For example, the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation between the United
States and Belgium provides that:
Vessels of either Contracting Party shall have liberty, on equal terms with vessel of the other Party
and on equal terms with vessels of any third country, to come with the cargoes to all ports, places
and waters of such other Party open to foreign commerce and navigation. Such vessels and cargoes
shall in the ports, places and waters of such other Party be accorded in all respects national
treatment and most-favored-nation treatment.
Feb. 21, 1961, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432, art. 13(1). FCN treaties do not necessarily preclude
a port State-party from denying access of vessels flying the flag of the other State-party. See McDougal
& Burke, supra note 451, at 109. For a compilation of FCN treaties to which the United States is party
see 6E Benedict on Admiralty ch. XVIII (7th rev. ed. 1997). Such treaties have been held by the Supreme
Court to be self-executing. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 340 (1924). The purpose of FCN
treaties is to free foreign corporations and citizens from discrimination based on alienage, not to accord
them greater rights than those held by United States citizens or domestic corporations. Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 187-88 (1982).
45546 U.S.C. app. § 142.
456See McDougal & Burke, supra note 451, at 156 ("It is universally acknowledged that once a ship
voluntarily enters a port it becomes fully subject to the law and regulations prescribed by the officials of
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foreign, non-public vessels entering United States ports and waterways
pursuant to an FCN treaty to comply with a variety of domestic laws and
regulations. 45 7 By contrast, state and local governments within the United
States are limited in the extent to which they may impede a foreign vessel's
access to United States ports where the federal government has permitted
such access by international agreement or other federal law.
Within the United States the terms of foreign vessel access to some
navigable waterways may also be controlled by bilateral vessel traffic
management agreements, such as t he Agreement for a Cooperative Vessel
Traffic Management System for the Juan de Fuca Region, 458 executed in
1979 (CVTMS Agreement). The CVTMS Agreement establishes a closely
coordinated system for vessel reporting and tracking throughout the north-
west straits that make up the boundary waters along the United States-
Canadian border in the State of Washington and the Province of British
Columbia. The President entered into the Agreement under authority of the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.459 The CVTMS is composed of a
Vessel Movement Reporting System, a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS),
and a Radar/TV Surveillance System. The TSS has been approved by the
IMO. Although vessels are not officially required to adhere to the TSS, any
vessel that fails to do so risks being found in violation of Rule 10 (or Rule
2a) of the Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea (COLREGS) of 1972460 if a collision results. The TSS thus effectively
forces in-bound vessels to transit through United States waters regardless of
their port of destination. Similarly, out-bound vessels are forced into
Canadian waters, regardless of their port of departure. Recognizing the
desirability of reciprocally facilitating transit of vessels in the region, the
United States and Canadian governments agreed that each nation will
in applying its regulations to vessels proceeding through its portion of the
applicable waters solely en route to or departing from a port of the other Party,
consider compliance with the requirements and enforcement practices of the
other Party, [and] consider compliance with the requirements of the other Party
to be effectively equivalent to material compliance with its own requirements,
so long as the requirements and enforcement practices of the other Party, in
that territory."); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 124-25 (1923) (access to ports may be
conditioned on compliance with United States law).457 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 1953 AMC 1210 (1953); Restatement, supra note 385, at § 152,
n.3. The United States is a party to the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, Apr.
9, 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 6251, 18 U.S.T. 411, which seeks to "facilitate maritime traffic by simplifying and
reducing to a minimum the formalities, documentary requirements and procedures on the arrival, stay and
departure of ships engaged in international voyages." Id. art. 1.458Dec. 19, 1979, United States-Canada, 32 U.S.T. 377, T.I.A.S. No. 9706.
45933 U.S.C. § 1230.460".I.A.S. No. 8587, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 734 (1973), entered into force July 15, 1977.
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their totality, continue to provide a comparable degree of marine safety and
environmental protection.
This provision lies at the heart of the Canadian Government protest over the
State of Washington's decision to apply Washington's merchant vessel
regulations to Canadian-bound vessels, at issue in the Intertanko v. Locke
litigation discussed in the first and third parts of this article.
C. International Conventions on Vessel Safety and Pollution Prevention
To facilitate analysis, the body of customary and conventional interna-
tional law addressing merchant vessel safety and marine pollution may be
divided into two broad spheres. The first sphere-the subject of this
article-includes the body of international law that establishes rules and
standards for vessel safety and vessel-source pollution prevention. 461 The
second sphere, which is beyond the scope of this article, includes the
conventions addressed to pollution response, compensation, and liability. 462
The first sphere is principally a body of public international law, while the
second includes subjects of private international law. Examination of United
States acceptance of international conventions on maritime matters demon-
strates that the nation has been quite selective in its decision whether to
become party to any given international regime. Although the United States
has been criticized for its reluctance to become party to some of the major
international conventions relating to the law of the sea and pollution
liability, the United States has been an outspoken supporter of international
conventions which set international standards for vessel safety and pollution
prevention. Dr. Frank L. Wiswall, Jr., a leading United States commentator
on international maritime law, has observed that "the present strong growth
of maritime law toward global uniformity based upon international maritime
regulation should be seen as a direct reaction to chaotic diversity of national
maritime legislation. ' '463
The role of international conventions in promoting uniformity in maritime
safety and pollution prevention has been well documented.464 The LOS
46 1Dempsey, Compliance and Enforcement in International Law-Oil Pollution of the Marine
Environment by Ocean Vessels, 6 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 459 (1984).462Conventions falling within this sphere include the CLC and Fund Conventions, supra note 415; the
1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties, T.I.A.S. No. 8068; and the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness,
Response and Cooperation, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 733 (1991).463 Wiswall, Uniformity in Maritime Law: The Domestic Impact of International Maritime Regula-
tions, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1208, 1208-09 (1983).464 See, e.g., lvanov, The Role of IMO in the Development of International Maritime Law, IMO News
1997:1 at 21-26; Berlingieri, Uniformity in Maritime Law and Implementation of International
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Convention refers frequently to "generally accepted international standards"
for vessel safety and pollution prevention. "Generally accepted international
standards" that must be enforced under the LOS Convention are those
adopted under the auspices of the IM0 465 and, to a lesser extent, the
International Labor Organization (ILO).466 Created in 1948,467 the IMO, an
organ of the United Nations, has sponsored some forty international
conventions, protocols, and other treaties, as well as hundreds of interna-
tional codes and recommendations. 468 The IMO Charter calls for the
organization to facilitate development of the "highest practicable stan-
dards. '469 By requiring compliance with generally accepted international
standards, the LOS Convention seeks to halt any international "race to the
bottom" by effectively universalizing the principal IMO and ILO conven-
tions, and by requiring flag States to enforce those conventions whether a
party to the underlying convention or not.470
IMO or ILO Conventions that establish the generally accepted interna-
tional standards include the 1974 Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
and its 1978 Protocol (SOLAS); 47t the 1973 Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships and its 1978 Protocol (MARPOL); 472 the 1978
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers (STCW); 473 the 1972 COLREGS Convention;474 the 1969 Con-
vention on Load Lines; 475 and the International Convention Concerning
Conventions, 18 J. Mar. L. & Com. 317 (1987); Wiswall, supra note 463; Yiannopoulus, The Unification
of Private Maritime Law by International Conventions, 30 L. & Contemp. Prob. 370 (1965).4 65The principal IMO-sponsored conventions are collected in 6D & 6E Benedict on Admiralty ch.
XIV (7th rev. ed. 1997).4 66The principal [LO-sponsored conventions are collected in 6B Benedict on Admiralty ch. IX (7th
rev. ed. 1997).4 67Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S.
No. 4044.4 68Current information on the IMO can be found at <http://www.imo.org>.
4 69 1MO Convention, supra note 467, art. I. Current information on treaties sponsored by the IMO is
available at <http://www.imo.org/imo/convent/treaty.htm>.4 70See LOS Convention art. 94(5); Restatement, supra note 385, at § 502 cmt. c. For an example under
United States law, see The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 188 (1871) (holding that the rules of the road
treaties had become international law by "universal acceptance.").4 71See supra note 420. SOLAS parallels the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944, 61
Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591. Rules and standards adopted pursuant to the ICAO convention are "law
of the land." L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 261 (1996).472See supra note 388.
473Entered into force, Apr. 28, 1984; 1995 Amendments entered into force Feb. 1, 1997; see Young,
Comprehensive Revision of International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW): An Overview, 26 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1 (1995).474See supra note 460.4751nterational Convention on Tonnage Measurement, T.I.A.S. No. 6331, entered into force July 18,
1982.
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Minimum Standards in Merchant Ships (ILO Convention 147).476 Although
potentially all of these conventions could prescribe the standards applicable
to any given vessel (depending on the vessel's tonnage, route, and cargo),
only three of the treaties will be analyzed here. Any preemption analysis of
a particular state act or regulation may, of course, require careful consider-
ation of all the relevant conventions.
Primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the international
standards under the IMO conventions (and under the LOS Convention) is
assigned to flag States. 477 Flag States which are party to the conventions may
set stricter standards for vessels flying their flag, as did the United States
until quite recently. But flag States may not set standards that fall below
those established by the conventions. 478 The conventions require flag State
"administrations" to conduct periodic surveys of their vessels, to verify
compliance with the conventions, and to issue appropriate certificates. 479
The IMO conventions also define the legal authority upon whom port State
enforcement powers may be conferred. 480 Only the designated port State
control authority may take action to enforce the conventions. Within the
United States, the United States Coast Guard has been designated as the
nation's port State enforcement "authority. '"481
1. The Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
The SOLAS Convention of 1974, as augmented by its 1978 Protocol, is
widely regarded as the most important and comprehensive of the interna-
tional treaties on vessel safety. 482 By January 1998, 137 nations, represent-
ing over 98% of the world's shipping, had become parties to SOLAS. 4 83 The
Convention's principal objective is to specify minimum international stan-
dards for construction, equipment, stability, machinery and electrical equip-
ment, lifesaving appliances, and fire detection and extinguishing equipment
476Convention Concerning Minimum Standards in Merchant Ships, reprinted in 15 1.L.M. 1288
(1976), entered into force Nov. 23, 1981. Article 2(a) of ILO 147 requires each state that ratifies the
Convention to "have laws or regulations laying down, for ships registered in its territory ... safety
standards, including standards of competency, hours of work and manning, so as to ensure the safety of
life on board ship." ILO 147 entered into force for the United States in 1989.477See, e.g., SOLAS ch. I.478see LOS Convention art. 211(2).
47 9See SOLAS ch. 1, regs. 6-13.
48°See, e.g., id. ch. I, reg. 19(a) (ships are subject to control by "officers duly authorized by" the port
State government); STCW Convention art. X(l).
481See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,234 (Sept. 3, 1980); 3 C.F.R. § 277 (1980 Comp.); 45 Fed. Reg. 5,880
(1980) (delegating SOLAS enforcement authority to the Coast Guard).
482See generally Focus on IMO: SOLAS, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1974 (Jan. 1998).483see IMO Treaty Ratification Tabulation table at <http://www.imo.org/imo/convent/treaty.htm>.
on passenger vessels and cargo vessels of 500 gross tons or more engaged
on international voyages.484 In addition, Chapter V of the Convention, titled
"Safety of Navigation," establishes operational requirements for all ships on
all voyages, and now provides for the introduction of mandatory ship
reporting systems. 485 Other chapters of the Convention address precautions
for the carriage of grain and other bulk cargoes 486 and dangerous goods
carried in packaged form. 487 SOLAS has been the subject of frequent
amendments. The 1978 Protocol to SOLAS, developed by the Conference
on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention (TSPP Conference) following a
number of tanker disasters in the Winter of 1976-77, added new require-
ments for inert gas systems, crude oil tank washing apparatus, and redundant
radar and steering equipment. Additional amendments, drafted by the IMO
Maritime Safety Committee, have been adopted over the years to address
hazards identified with ferries and bulk cargo vessels. SOLAS amendments
adopted in 1994 established a requirement for tankers to be fitted with
emergency towing equipment488 and added Chapter IX, requiring vessel
operators to implement the International Safety Management Code (ISM
Code),4 8 9 and Chapter XI, establishing enhanced inspection requirements for
older vessels. The ISM Code, the purpose of which is to "provide an
international standard for the safe management and operation of ships and
for pollution prevention," promises to be one of the most profound
developments in the regulation of merchant shipping since the original 1974
SOLAS Convention was concluded.490
The SOLAS Convention expressly provides for port State control,4 91 and
now includes provisions for port State control authorities to assess the
484 5OLAS Annex, ch. I, reg. 1, 3 & 4. Vessel construction is addressed in SOLAS ch. II; equipment
in chs. II, IV & V/12; operations and management in chs. V-XI. Vessel manning and crew language
capability is addressed in ch. V, reg. 13. Covered vessels are required to carry a SOLAS Minimum Safe
Manning Document, SOLAS ch. V, reg. 13(b), in addition to the individual licenses required by STCW
art. VI. Tanker emergency towing equipment is addressed in SOLAS ch. V, reg. 15-1.
485SOLAS ch. V now requires vessels to carry gyro and magnetic compasses, radar and radar plotting
aids (ARPAs), an echo-sounder, devices to indicate speed and distance, rudder angle indicators and rate
of turn indicators, radio-direction finding equipment, and equipment for homing on the radiotelephone
distress frequency. SOLAS ch. V, reg. 12. Since May 1994, coastal States have also had the power to
implement mandatory ship reporting systems. Id. ch. V, reg. 8-1.
486SOLAS ch. VI. Grain cargoes are prone to shift within the vessel, potentially capsizing the vessel.
Chapter VI contains provisions concerning stowing, trimming, and securing grain cargoes.
4 7SOLAN ch. VII.
4 8SOLAS ch. V, reg. 15-1.
489The IMO Assembly unanimously adopted the ISM Code in 1993 as non-mandatory resolution
A.741(18). The 1994 amendments made the Code mandatory beginning July 1, 1998 for most vessels.490See generally Sahatjian, The ISM Code: A Brief Overview, 29 J. Mar. L. & Com. 405 (1998);
Poulos, Legal Implications of the ISM Code: New Impediments to Sea Fever, 9 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 37
(1996).49 11d. ch. I, reg. 19.
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crew's performance in executing operational requirements.492 The Conven-
tion provides that "[e]very ship when in a port of another Contracting
Government is subject to control by officers duly authorized by such
Government in so far as this control is directing toward verifying that the
[certificates] are valid. '493 Certificates required by SOLAS include a
Minimum Safe Manning Document, Safety Construction Certificate, Safety
Equipment Certificate, an Intact Stability Book, and a Safety Radio
Certificate. 494 As of July 1998, covered vessels must also hold certificates
attesting to their compliance with the new ISM Code. The Convention
provides that SOLAS and ISM certificates shall be accepted unless there are
clear grounds for believing that the condition of the ship or of her equipment
does not correspond substantially with the particulars of any of the
certificates. 495
SOLAS requirements have been made applicable to United States vessels
by federal statutes and regulations. 496 Even in the absence of implementing
federal statute, United States courts have treated the SOLAS requirements as
self-executing 497 or have applied them as a component of the general
maritime law. 498 The port State control provisions in the SOLAS Conven-
tion restrict United States authority over foreign vessels whose flag State is
party to SOLAS ex cathedra and are therefore self-executing with respect to
foreign vessels within United States waters. 499 Within the United States, the
President has assigned SOLAS enforcement authority to the United States
Coast Guard.500 As discussed below, the Coast Guard implements its
authority as a port State control authority under SOLAS (and the other
IMO-sponsored conventions) through an elaborate Port State Control
Initiative.50t
492
Id. ch. XI, reg. 4; IMO Res. A.787(19).
49 3SOLAS ch. I, reg. 19(a).494A compilation of the certificates required by the principal international conventions is provided in
Doc. No. 14-19 in 6E Benedict on Admiralty (7th rev. ed. 1997).49 5SOLAS ch. I, reg. 19(b).
496See infra section V-A.497Complaint of Damodar Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 903 F.2d 675, 1990 AMC 1544 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that "[tihis circuit recognizes SOLAS as having the status of law enforceable in American
courts.") (citing Alkmeon Naviera, S.A. v. M/V Marina L, 633 F.2d 789, 793, 1982 AMC 153 (9th Cir.
1980)).498See United States v. Ultramar Shipping Co., 685 F. Supp. 887, 1988 AMC 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
affd mem., 854 F.2d 1315, 1988 AMC 2408 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that "[t]he SOLAS Conventions
Irepresent a uniform set of internationally recognized navigational rules and thus they have the status of
general maritime law."').499See supra notes 329, 330, and 386 (listing authorities concluding that treaty provisions which
restrict a party's actions are self-executing).
S°°Exec. Order No. 12,234 (Sept. 3, 1980); 3 C.F.R. § 277 (1980 Comp.); reprinted in 33 U.S.C.
§ 1602.
50 1See infra section V-A.
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2. The Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)
In 1973, the IMO member States adopted the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, which eventually superseded its
1954 predecessor.502 The ambitious, but unrealized, goal of the MARPOL
Convention is "the complete elimination of international pollution of the
marine environment by oil and other harmful substances and the minimiza-
tion of accidental discharges of such substances." 50 3 MARPOL is presently
organized into five annexes, 5°4 which collectively cover the technical and
operational aspects of pollution from ships. Each annex is addressed to a
distinct class of pollutants, including oil (Annex I); noxious liquid sub-
stances carried in bulk (Annex II); harmful substances carried in packages
such as containers and tanks (Annex III); vessel sewage (Annex IV); and
garbage and other ship-generated wastes (Annex V). The IMO Assembly has
adopted a sixth annex which, if ratified, will eventually establish interna-
tional standards for air pollution emissions by vessels. 505 All parties to the
Convention are bound by Annexes I and II. Annexes III, IV, and V are
optional, permitting States-parties to opt out of those provisions by entering
appropriate declarations. As of January 1998, Annex IV lacked sufficient
ratifications to enter into force. A total of 104 nations are party to MARPOL,
representing over 93% of the world's ships by tonnage.506 The United States
has ratified most of the Convention and Protocols 507 and has implemented
their provisions by statutes and regulations.50 8
MARPOL establishes international vessel design, construction, and
equipment standards designed to prevent or reduce pollution. Those stan-
dards include, inter alia, requirements for minimum vessel subdivision and
damage stability, segregated ballast tanks, double bottom tanks, crude oil
502MARPOL art. 9(1).
50 31d. Preamble. Compare Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(1) ("it is the national goal that the
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.").
5
°4The five Annexes are: I - Pollution by Oil; I1 - Pollution by Noxious Substances; III - Pollution by
Harmful Substances in Packages; IV - Pollution by Sewage; and, V - Pollution by Garbage from Ships.5051f and when MARPOL Annex VI enters into force for the United States, a reexamination of the
Supreme Court's decision in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 1960 AMC
1549 (1960), may be necessary, with the possible goal of enacting a federal preemption provision similar
to the one provided by the Clean Air Act for aircraft under 42 U.S.C. § 7573.506See IMO Treaty Ratification table available at <http://www.imo.org/imo/convent/treaty.htm>;
1997 Green Globe Yearbook 114 (H. Bergesen & G. Parmann eds. 1997). Some nations have entered
exceptions to individual annexes to the Convention. Id.507The United States signed the 1978 MARPOL Protocol, subject to ratification, on June 27, 1978.
H.R. Rep. No. 96-12224, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4849, 4850. The Senate gave its
advice and consent to the ratification on July 2, 1980. 126 Cong. Rec. S9263-72 (daily ed. July 2, 1980).
The Protocol was implemented in the United States by Pub. L. No. 96-478, 94 Stat. 2297, on October
21, 1980.50 See infra section V-A.
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tank washing equipment, inert gas systems (for fire protection), oily-water
separators, and discharge monitoring equipment. Vessel size and cargo
govern the applicability of MARPOL rules and standards. 50 9 The 1978
MARPOL Protocol, drafted at the 1978 TSPP Conference, established
stricter standards for all vessels and a requirement for periodic flag State
surveys. A vessel's compliance with MARPOL is demonstrated by issuance
of an International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP) certificate. 510 MARPOL
was substantially amended in 1992, adopting proposals developed by the
IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee. The 1992 amendments,
widely regarded as the most significant changes to the convention since the
1978 Protocol was adopted, entered into force in 1995. They include a
requirement for enhanced inspections of tank vessels five or more years
old5 l ' and a schedule for phased-in implementation of double hull construc-
tion or an equivalent design for tank vessels. 512 Since 1995, all tank vessels
over 150 tons and all dry cargo vessels over 400 tons have also been required
to hold a Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP).513
As with SOLAS, MARPOL places primary responsibility for enforcement
on the vessel's flag State. Flag States are required to conduct initial and
recurrent vessel surveys and to issue IOPP Certificates to vessels which meet
MARPOL requirements. 51 4 Port State control measures are also included in
the Convention515 and may now extend to operational requirements. 51 6
Possession of a valid IOPP certificate is prima facie evidence that the vessel
complies with the Convention. Port States may extend their inspection
beyond the IOPP certificates only where there are clear grounds for
believing that the condition of the ship or of her equipment does not
correspond substantially with the particulars of any of the certificates. 517
Any violation of MARPOL within the jurisdiction of any party is punishable
5 09 Certain MARPOL rules or standards, such as those establishing construction and equipment
requirements, apply only to larger vessels.5 10MARPOL Annex I, reg. 5. IOPP certificates may be issued only to a vessel the flag State of which
is a party to the Convention. Id. reg. 6(4). Vessels sailing under the flag of a non-party may be issued
an IOPP certificate equivalent. Id. reg. 6(1).5 11MARPOL Annex I, reg. 13-G (entered into force July 6, 1993).5 121d. reg. 13-F (entered into force July 6, 1993). MARPOL requires affected vessels to be fitted with
double hulls or an equivalent design that will ensure the same level of protection against pollution in the
event of a collision or stranding. Alternative design standards must be approved by the Marine
Environment Protection Committee, based on guidelines developed by the IMO.513MARPOL Annex I, reg. 26. The requirement is implemented in the United States in 33 C.F.R. §
151.26.514 MARPOL Annex I, regs. 5-8.
515Id. arts. 4-6. Under article 5(4) of MARPOL, contracting port States must apply the Convention's
requirements to ships flyig the flag of a non-party "as may be necessary to ensure that no more favorable
treatment is given to such ships."5161d. Annex I, reg. 8a, Annex II, reg. 15 & Annex V, reg. 8 (1994 & 1995 Amendments).
5171d. art. 5(2).
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by either the party in whose waters the violation occurred or the vessel's flag
State. 518 States are required to take action against violators, ensuring that
penalties are "adequate in severity to discourage violations." 519
3. The Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW)
For decades, national merchant vessel safety authorities throughout the
world have recognized that human error is the cause of the vast majority of
marine casualties. Recent studies estimate that approximately 80% of all
vessel casualties can be traced to human error.520 Yet it was not until 1978
that the IMO member nations directly addressed the urgent need to ensure
the competence of seafarers by crafting a comprehensive convention on
standards for professional mariners. 521 Until that time, individual govern-
ments, often with no intergovernmental cooperation, established training,
certification, and watchkeeping standards for seafarers. The standards
adopted by a number of nations proved unsatisfactory to many port States.
The STCW Convention, the purpose of which is "to promote the safety of
life and property at sea and the protection of the marine environment by
establishing in common agreement international standards of training,
certification and watchkeeping for seafarers," 522 now provides almost
universally accepted minimum international standards for professional
mariners. The Convention has been described as reflecting "the highest
practicable standards which could be globally agreed [to] at the time of its
adoption." 523
The STCW Convention is organized into seventeen substantive articles,
accompanied by a new STCW Code, added by the 1995 amendments. 524 The
STCW Code is further divided into Part A, containing mandatory provisions,
and Part B, containing recommended guidance to assist parties in imple-
menting the convention. A total of 130 nations, representing 98% of the
5 181d. art. 4; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1907.
5 19Id. art. 4.520See supra note 446 and accompanying text.52 1The STCW Convention is a product of the IMO/ILO Joint Committee on Training. See Focus on
IMO: The New STCW Convention 1 (Apr. 1997).522STCW Convention, preamble.
523Id. at 2.524The 1995 amendments became effective on February 1, 1997. See 62 Fed. Reg. 34506, 34506
(1997) (United States Coast Guard interim rules implementing 1995 Amendments) ("The amendments
adopted in July 1995 are comprehensive and detailed. They concern port-state control, communication
of information to IMO to allow for mutual oversight, and responsibilities of all Parties to ensures that
seafarers meet objective standards of competence.").
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world's shipping, have become party to the Convention. 525 The STCW
Convention and Code apply to all seagoing vessels other than public vessels,
fishing vessels, and yachts.526 STCW does not establish minimum manning
requirements for vessels. Manning standards are established instead by the
SOLAS Convention.527
Primary authority for ensuring compliance with the STCW is assigned to
flag States and to the States issuing STCW certificates to seafarers. Parties
to the STCW Convention have a duty to issue certificates to merchant
mariners attesting to their compliance with the training, qualification, and
medical standards. 528 Candidates for certificates must pass an examination
requiring the applicant to demonstrate not only professional knowledge but
also "adequate knowledge of the English language," including an ability to
use the IMO Standard Marine Navigational Vocabulary. 529 Mariners must be
reexamined for fitness and professional competence at least every five
years530 and attend periodic refresher courses to maintain their competency.
The STCW Convention contains particularized requirements' for tank
vessels, requiring officers and rated crewmembers on tankers to possess
specialized training in firefighting and to complete a tanker familiarization
course. 531 The Convention also establishes elaborate in-port and underway
watchkeeping requirements, 532 and fixes minimum crew rest periods. 533
While in the port of a party, ships are subject to STCW control provisions
by officers duly authorized by the port State. Even ships of non-parties are
subject to control when they are visiting ports of a nation which is party to
the STCW Convention.5 34 Port State control officers are authorized by the
Convention to verify that all seafarers serving on board who are required
under the Convention to hold certificates do in fact possess such certifi-
cates. 535 STCW certificates shall be accepted by port State control officers
unless there are clear grounds for believing that the certificate was obtained
fraudulently, the holder is not the person named on the certificate, or that the
issuing nation failed to follow the STCW standards in issuing the certifi-
525Focus on IMO: The New STCW Convention 2 (Apr. 1997).
526STCW Convention art. III.
527See SOLAS ch. V, reg. 13; see also IMO Resolution A.481(XII) (1981).528STCW Convention art. 1, regs. 6-9.
5291d. art. H1, reg. 2.
53
°Id. reg. 5.
53 1STCW Convention Annex, art. V, reg. 1; STCW Code § A-V/I.
5321d. Annex, ch. VIII & STCW Code § A-VIII.
5331d. STCW Code § A-VIII/I1.
534STCW Convention Annex, art. X. Article X requires parties to exercise control over all vessels to
the extent necessary to ensure that no more favorable treatment is given to ships of non-parties.
1351d. art. X (1-2).
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cate.536 The 1995 amendments to the STCW Convention require the IMO to
monitor individual State compliance with the Convention. 537 Under those
same 1995 amendments, port State control authority has also been extended,
permitting control authorities to require foreign vessel crewmembers to
demonstrate operational competency at their place of duty.538
V
FLAG STATE/PORT STATE PRESCRIPTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES
In prescribing and enforcing rules and standards for merchant vessels the
United States government acts in two distinct capacities. First, the federal
government acts as a flag State, enforcing the generally accepted interna-
tional rules and standards and prescribing and enforcing any additional
United States domestic standards applicable to United States flag vessels.
Second, the federal government acts as a port State (or, in its adjacent
waters, as a coastal State) with respect to foreign vessels entering United
States ports and waters. In its capacity as a port State, the United States
enforces the generally accepted international rules and standards to the
extent permitted by international agreement and prescribes and enforces any
additional domestic rules and standards applicable to foreign vessels while
in United States ports or waters. As discussed above, in its capacity as a port
State the United States government's power to prescribe and enforce rules
and standards against foreign flag vessel has been limited by international
agreements. These limitations are incorporated into a number of federal
statutes and regulations and the United States Port State Control program.
A. Implementation of International Agreements on Port Access and Vessel
Safety
As a flag Sate, the United States has plenary jurisdiction to prescribe and
enforce rules and standards for vessels flying its flag. Indeed, as a flag State,
the nation has a duty to prescribe and enforce standards which are at least as
stringent as the generally-accepted international standards. 539 As a port
1361d. art. X (1-2).
5371d. Annex, art. I, reg. 7 & 8(1.3). If the IMO determines that a State has failed to comply, its
certificates may not be recognized as meeting STCW requirements. Id. art. I, reg. 7(3).
5381d. Annex, art. I, reg. 4(1.3); STCW Code § A-1/4(4).
539LOS Convention arts. 94 & 217.
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State, however, United States jurisdiction to prescribe rules and standards
for foreign vessels is limited by international law. Beyond the limits
imposed by customary international law and the LOS Convention, the
United States has, by entering into a number of international agreements,
voluntarily limited its jurisdiction over vessels flying the flag of any other
party to those agreements. These limitations, contained in the principal
IMO-sponsored conventions and, to a lesser extent, the various FCN treaties,
are generally seen as justified by the national interest in promoting comity
and obtaining reciprocal treatment for United States flag vessels.
1. Implementation of IMO Conventions in the United States
Congress has recognized that "the United States is signatory to a number
of international treaties on maritime safety and seamen's welfare, such as the
various Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) treaties," and that their provisions
and requirements are part of the United States maritime law and in many
cases are quite extensive.54 0 SOLAS has been implemented for United States
flag vessels by various provisions of Titles 33 and 46 of the United States
Code and a multitude of Coast Guard regulations (discussed below).
The United States is also a party to the MARPOL Convention. One
recent United States exception to the Convention concerns the MARPOL
requirement for double hull or equivalent protection. MARPOL regula-
tions 1/13F and 1/13G require tankers to be fitted with double hulls or an
alternative design which, in the opinion of the IMO, "provides the same
level of protection against oil outflow in the event of collisions or
strandings." 541 The United States has rejected the "equivalent" design
alternative, electing instead to require that tankers be fitted with double
hulls. 542 Consistent with its position under domestic law, the United
States notified the IMO that it did not intend to be bound by the IMO
standards unless and until it expressly consented. 543 Canada entered a
540H.R. Rep. No. 98-338, at 136 (1983), reprinted in 46 U.S.C.A. tit. II, at 507. The United States
is also party to several other conventions which, for purposes of economy, will not be discussed. These
include the 1966 International Convention on Load Lines, the 1969 International Convention on Tonnage
Measurement of Ships, and the 1972 International Convention for Safe Containers.54 1MARPOL Annex I, reg. 13F(5).
54246 U.S.C. § 3703a. See generally National Research Council, Double-Hull Tanker Legislation: An
Assessment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (1998).
14'56 Fed. Reg. 44,051, 44,052 (1991) ("The United States delegation to the [IMO Marine
Environment Protection Committee] reserved its position on provisions within the MARPOL amend-
ments that are inconsistent with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990."). MARPOL art. 16(4)(b) ("Any party [to
the convention] which has declined to accept an amendment to an Annex shall be treated as a non-Party
only for the purpose of application of that amendment."). In accordance with MARPOL art. 16(2)(f)(ii),
the United States notified the Secretary-General of the IMO that the amendments would not enter into
force in the United States until the United States provided its "express approval" of the amendment. See
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similar exception in its ratification of the North America Free Trade
Agreement. 544
Several statutes and regulations, including the Act to Prevent Pollution by
Ships (APPS), implemented the MARPOL Convention in the United
States.545 APPS makes no provision for "saving" application of state law.
The Act does, however, provide that "[a]ny action taken under this chapter
shall be taken in accordance with international law."' 546 In enacting imple-
menting legislation in the United States, Congress expressly incorporated
the MARPOL port State control limitations. 547 In closely related legislation,
the federal Clean Water Act exempts oil discharges permitted under
MARPOL.548 Many of the MARPOL requirements applicable to tank
vessels were enacted into United States law by the Port and Tanker Safety
Act of 1978 (PTSA)549 and the Regulations Relating to Tank Vessels
Carrying Oil in Bulk (33 C.F.R. part 157). Those regulations establish
standards for the design, equipment, and operations of oil tank vessels.
Among other things, the regulations require crude oil washing systems and
dedicated clean ballast tanks550 on certain tank vessels of specified tonnages
and ages.
The United States is a party to the STCW Convention and has adopted
the 1995 amendments. Coast Guard regulations implementing the 1995
Letter from Embassy of the United States to Secretary-General of the IMO (Dec. 23, 1992) (copy on file
with the author).
544North America Free Trade Agreement art. 1203 (Most-Favored-Nation Treatment) (Canada-U.S.-
Mexico), entered into force Jan. 1, 1994 ("Canada reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure
relating to the implementation of agreements, arrangements and other formal or informal undertakings
with other countries with respect to maritime activities in waters of mutual interest in such areas as
pollution control (including double-hull requirements for oil tankers), safe navigation, barge inspection
standards, water quality, pilotage, salvage, drug abuse control and maritime communications.").54 5Pub. L. No. 96-478, 94 Stat. 2297 (1980) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1912). As directed by
the Act, the United States Coast Guard promulgated implementing regulations in 33 C.F.R. pt. 151. See
48 Fed. Reg. 45,704-45,727 (Oct. 6, 1983) ("Pollution Prevention; Implementation of Outstanding
MARPOL 73/78 Provisions"). Amendments to APPS to implement Annex V to MARPOL were effected
by the Marine Plastic Pollution Research and Control Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-220, § 2002, 101
Stat. 1460 (1987). Regulations implementing MARPOL were also promulgated at 33 C.F.R. pts. 155, 157
& 158.
54633 U.S.C. § 1912.547Id. § 1904(d).
54 1d. § 1321(b)(3); 40 C.F.R. § 110.9; see generally 33 C.F.R. pt. 151 and MARPOL Annex I, reg.
9. The exemption dates back to Pub. L. No. 91-224 (discharges permitted under the Convention are not
prohibited).
549See infra section V-C.55 0Dedicated clean ballast tanks (CBT) are tanks used exclusively for carrying ballast water. Installing
CBTs on tank vessels obviates the need to ballast oil cargo tanks, thus avoiding the pollution associated
with discharging "dirty," i.e., oil-contaminated, ballast water.
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Amendments in the United States became effective July 28, 1997.551 The
rules broadly incorporate numerous provisions of the STCW Convention
and STCW Code by reference. 552
With few exceptions (discussed below) the rules and standards that
foreign vessels in United States ports and waters must meet are prescribed
by international conventions. In a development that surprised many, and one
that bespeaks a new confidence in the international regime, the United States
has embarked on a regulatory reform initiative that will harmonize the
domestic law requirements applicable to United States flag vessels with the
international standards established by the IMO conventions.5 53 The Coast
Guard's stated goal is to "implement its statutory mandate in regulations that
are consistent with international standards whenever doing so is lawful,
appropriate and practical. '554
2. United States Enforcement of IMO Conventions
Enforcement refers to the process used to induce or compel compliance
with rules prescribed by competent authority.555 An authority other than the
one that prescribed the rule being enforced may take enforcement actions. A
distinction must be made between enforcement of United States law
against United States vessels, as an exercise of its jurisdiction as a flag
State, and United States enforcement of international rules and standards
against foreign vessels under applicable port State enforcement provi-
sions. Implementation and enforcement of rules and standards prescribed
by the IMO conventions with respect to United States flag vessels is
examined in section V-B below. Enforcement of those rules and
standards with respect to foreign vessels in United States ports and
waterways is accomplished through the United States Port State Control
Initiative.
Any international agreement to which the United States is party and which
is self-executing is incorporated into United States federal law without the
5'62 Fed. Reg. 34,506 (1997) (interim rule with request for comments).552
Id. at 34,529 (incorporating STCW into 46 C.F.R. § 10.102(b)); 34,534 (incorporating STCW into
46 C.F.R. § 12.01-3(b)); 34,538 (incorporating STCW into 46 C.F.R. § 15.105(b)).553 See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 58,804 (1996).
15462 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1624 (1997).
555 Restatement, supra note 385, at § 431.
need for implementing legislation. As earlier discussed, aspects of certain of
the IMO conventions are self-executing. 56 Of particular importance in any
preemption analysis is the fact that the port State control provisions
established by the principal IMO-sponsored conventions are self-executing.
Those limitations on United States prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction
to which the federal government has agreed in the IMO conventions are "law
of the land" under Article VI of the Constitution.5 57
Foreign vessel violations of governing international conventions are
detected and remedied through the port State control program. Congress has,
for the most part, left port State control to the Executive Branch. The United
States Coast Guard launched a Port State Control Initiative (PSCI) for the
United States in 1994.558 The PSCI built upon the Coast Guard's foreign
passenger vessel control verification program and its foreign tanker-
boarding program, in place since 1977. Recognizing that 95% of all
passenger and cargo vessels and 75% of all tank ships calling on United
States ports fly foreign flags, the Coast Guard resolved to devote increased
attention to the condition of those vessels and their crews. The Coast Guard
program is designed to identify substandard vessels and vessel operating
companies and force them to either comply with vessel safety and pollution
prevention standards or stay out of United States waters. Key features of the
Coast Guard's PSCI include a risk-oriented matrix used for prioritizing
vessels for boarding and so-called "target" lists of vessel owners and
operators, classification societies, and flag States whose vessels will be
assigned a boarding priority. During the first year of its PSCI the Coast
Guard boarded over 16,000 foreign vessels-up 92% over the prior year.
Thirty percent of those vessels were found to be deficient, and 2% were
detained.559 It bears repeating that, in each case, the Coast Guard was
enforcing international standards, established by the IMO-sponsored con-
ventions, not United States law.
Congress has, in nearly all subjects, recognized that a foreign vessel's
compliance with international standards satisfies conditions for entry into
United States ports and waterways. In establishing a system of reciprocity
for foreign vessels, other than tank vessels, entering United States ports or
556See supra note 497.55 7Assignment of primary enforcement authority to the flag State, while reserving port States a limited
role, serves important foreign and domestic policy purposes and objective of the national government, the
most prominent being the desire to obtain similar favorable treatment for United States vessels in foreign
ports.
55859 Fed. Reg. 36,826 (1994).559Glass, Happy Anniversary for US Safety Initiative, Lloyd's List (Apr. 28, 1995).
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waters by 46 U.S.C. § 3303, Congress noted that the statute "acknowledges
the international concept of comity with respect to recognizing inspection
laws and standards for foreign flag vessels that are similar to those of the
United States. If a foreign nation is signatory to the SOLAS Convention, it
is presumed to have similar standards." 560 Although Congress did not extend
the same absolute reciprocity to foreign tankers entering United States ports
or waters, 561 it granted authority to the Secretary of Transportation to accept
a foreign vessel's compliance with treaties to which the United States is a
party as evidence of the vessel's qualification for a certificate of compliance
with United States tanker laws. 562
United States law does not address manning standards for foreign vessels
other than tank vessels operating within United States ports and waters. The
SOLAS Convention requires that such vessels hold a valid Safe Manning
Certificate,563 and any mariners on board must hold certificates complying
with the STCW Convention. By contrast, United States law requires the
Secretary of Transportation to review the manning levels, training, qualifi-
cation, and watchkeeping standards on foreign tank vessels entering United
States ports and waters, to determine whether those standards are at least
equivalent to United States or international standards accepted by the United
States.564 Congress intended that the STCW Convention would provide the
acceptable international standards for training, qualification, and watchkeep-
ing.565 The statute requires the Secretary to prohibit entry of vessels failing
to meet those standards.
B. Regulation of Shipping and the Navigable Waters
Any analysis of preemption of state regulation of merchant vessels must
consider the full panoply of federal statutes and regulations, including Title
46 of the United States Code and the implementing regulations promulgated
in Title 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 566 These statutes and
regulations, together with selected sections of Title 33 of the United States
Code and the Code of Federal Regulations, comprehensively regulate
56°H.R. Rep. No. 98-338, at 139 (1983), reprinted in 46 U.S.C.A. at 510 (1997).
5 61See 46 U.S.C. § 3702.
56246 U.S.C. § 3711; H.R. Rep No. 98-338, at 151-52 (1983), reprinted in 46 U.S.C.A. at 524 (1997).
56 3SOLAS ch. V. reg. 14; IMO Res. A.481. See supra note 494 and accompanying text.
56446 U.S.C. § 9101.
56 5H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, at 132 (1990) ("The conferees intend that 'standards equivalent to
United States law' or 'international standards accepted in the United States' may be considered to include
the Convention on Standards for the Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers.").56 6See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1987) (in examining whether a state statute
is preempted, a court must look to federal law as a whole and to the federal law's object and policy).
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commercial vessels. These two statutory titles, as well as international law,
define the boundaries of federal and state authority over commercial vessel
safety and pollution.
Federal regulation of merchant vessel safety began 160 years ago with
Congress' enactment of the Steamboat Act of 1838.567 Under that Act, all
steamboats were required to be inspected every six months and to carry a
federal certificate of inspection attesting to the vessel's seaworthiness.
Additional merchant vessel safety legislation followed in short order.568 The
1852 Boiler Inspection Act created a requirement for pilots and engineers to
hold federal licenses.569 In 1871, Congress repealed all previous vessel
safety statutes and enacted a new comprehensive code of navigation and
inspection laws. 570 This code eventually became Title 52 of the Revised
Statutes. In 1885, Congress extended the United States steamboat inspection
laws to cover foreign vessels carrying passengers to or from United States
ports.571 The currently effective provisions of these early acts are now
collected in Title 46 of the United States Code.
Title 46 imposes on the Coast Guard a mandatory duty to establish
regulations governing the design, construction, alteration, repair, mainte-
nance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of tank
vessels.572 The Secretary is required to consult with other federal agencies
and with state representatives in formulating the regulations. 573 The statute,
which extends to both United States and foreign flag vessels, provides that
in promulgating regulations the Secretary may prescribe different regula-
tions applicable to vessels in the domestic trade, and also may prescribe
regulations that exceed standards set internationally. 574 The Coast Guard's
implementing regulations span seven volumes of Title 46 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, along with a number of chapters in Title 33 of the Code
of Federal Regulations.
United States and foreign flag tank vessels in United States waters are
5675 Stat. 304. A summarized history of the United States Coast Guard's regulatory authority is
provided in H.R. Rep. No. 98-338, at 122-23, 136-37 & 147 (1983), which accompanies Pub. L. No.
98-89, 97 Stat. 500 (1983) (recodifying and enacting into positive law Subtitle II of Title 46, Shipping,
of the United States Code), reprinted in 46 U.S.C.A at 490-91, 507-08 & 519 (1997) and in 1983
U.S.C.C.A.N. 948-49; see also Land & Lake Tours, Inc. v. Lewis, 738 F.2d 961,964 n.4 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984) (tracing history of United States steamboat inspection laws).568Act of 1843, 5 Stat. 626; Act of 1847, 9 Stat. 127; Act of 1849, 9 Stat. 299; Act of 1852, 10 Stat.
1852; Act of 1855, 13 Stat. 120 (1955).
56910 Stat. 1852 (1852).
57016 Stat. 440 (1871).
17'22 Stat. 346 (1885).
57246 U.S.C. §§ 3703(a) & 3306(a).
5731d. § 3703(c).
5741d. § 3703(a).
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subject to inspection by the Coast Guard. 575 Under the "reciprocity" section
of the statutes, however, inspection of vessels, the flag State of which has
standards similar to those of the United States and which has an unexpired
certificate of inspection issued by its flag State, are limited to ensuring that
the condition of the vessel is as stated in the certificate of inspection. 576 A
flag State's inspection laws (and its safety "standards" 577) are deemed
"similar" to those of the United States when the flag State is a party to the
SOLAS Convention. 578 The privilege is extended only on a reciprocal basis,
to vessels of States that have by their "laws accorded to vessels of the United
States visiting that country the same privileges. '579 Similar reciprocity
privileges are incorporated into the United States load line580 and vessel
tonnage measurement statutes.581 The Coast Guard Authorization Act of
1996 included new requirements that implement the ISM Code for safe ship
management contained in Annex IX of the SOLAS Convention. 582 The
Coast Guard is directed by the Act to ensure that the regulations adopted are
consistent with the Annex IX of SOLAS (the ISM Code). 583
Foreign tank vessels operating in United States navigable waters must, in
addition to meeting relevant international requirements, obtain a certificate
attesting to their compliance with chapter 37 of Title 46 of the United States
Code.584 The statute contains two important accommodations for foreign
flag vessels. First, the requirements do not apply to foreign vessels in
innocent passage on the navigable waters of the United States. 585 Second, in
determining the vessel's compliance with chapter 37, the Secretary may
accept any part of a certificate, endorsement, or document issued by a
foreign nation under "a treaty, convention, or other international agreement
to which the United States is a party." 586
5751d. § 3301 & ch. 37.576
Id. § 3303(a).
57 7See supra note 560 and accompanying text.
57 S1d.
5791d.
5 ld. § 5109(a) & (b).58 11d. § 14306.
582Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-324, Title VI, Coast Guard Regulatory
Reform Act, codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3205 (Supp. 1997). The Coast Guard's final implementing
rules were published on Dec. 29, 1997. See 62 Fed. Reg. 67,492 (1997).
...46 U.S.C. § 3203(b) (1997 Supp.). The Coast Guard's final rule implementing the ISM Code took
effect January 23, 1998. See 62 Fed. Reg. 67,492 (Dec. 29, 1997).
5 41d. § 3711 (a).
5 5 Id. § 3702(e).
586 Id.
Vol. 29, No. 4
Merchant Vessels 595
C. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 and the 1978 Port and
Tanker Safety Act
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA)587 comprises two
titles. Title I, codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236, focuses on port and
waterfront safety, vessel navigation safety, operating requirements, and
traffic control. Title II addresses certain aspects of tanker design and
construction standards. Title II provisions were principally codified at 46
U.S.C. § 391a.5 88 As recodified and enacted into positive law, those
provisions are now found at 46 U.S.C. chapters 33 and 37.589 The Port and
Tanker Safety Act (PTSA) amended the PWSA in 1978. Together these acts
serve a critical role in the regulation of merchant vessel safety and pollution
prevention and figure prominently in contemporary preemption analyses.
1. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972
In enacting the PWSA, Congress sought to protect vessels, bridges, and
waterfront structures on or immediately adjacent to the navigable waters of
the United States from damage or destruction and to protect the waters and
the resources therein from environmental harm which may result from
accidents involving those vessels and waterfront facilities.590 Title I of the
Act authorized the secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is
operating to establish vessel traffic services (VTSs) for United States ports and
waterways, to require vessels operating within a VTS to comply with VTS
requirements, and to carry equipment necessary to participate in the VTS.591
The Coast Guard 592 was further given broad authority to control vessel traffic
5 7Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424. The legislative history of the Act is reproduced at 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2766. The Act has been amended several times, most prominently by the Port and Tanker
Safety Act, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (1978). See also Pub. L. No. 98-557, 98 Stat. 2875
(1984), Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 890 (1986), Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 514 (1990).
588Tank Vessel Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1889; see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 161, 1978
AMC 527 (1978).
5891mplementing regulations can be found at 33 C.F.R. pt. 157.
59 0PWSA, supra note 587, tit. I, § 101, 86 Stat. at 424.
59 1Id. § 101(1) & (2). The Vessel Traffic Management Regulations, 33 C.F.R. pt. 161, govern the
procedures and requirements for operating within designated Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) areas. See
generally C. Koburger, Vessel Traffic Systems (1986) (chapter VIII of which addresses "law and the
future"); Note, Vessel Traffic Services and Liability for Oil Spills and Other Maritime Accidents, 18
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 482 (1979). The PWSA does not implicitly preempt state or local government
mooring or anchoring regulations which do not concern safety standards of vessels. Beveridge v. Lewis,
939 F.2d 859, 1992 AMC 130 (9th Cir. 1991).59 2The Secretary of Transportation delegated rulemaking authority to the Commandant of the Coast
Guard. 49 C.F.R. 1.46(n).
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where hazardous conditions warranted 593 and to establish safety zones, regu-
lated navigation areas, and limited access areas in hazardous areas. Where
necessary for safety, the Coast Guard may direct the movement of specific
vessels.
Under authority of both Title I and Title II of the Act, the Coast Guard
promulgated a body of navigation safety regulations (NSRs) and vessel
operating and equipment requirements.5 94 The NSRs apply to all non-public
vessels over 1,600 gross tons while operating in the navigable waters of the
United States, 595 with the exception of foreign vessels in innocent passage
through the territorial sea or transit passage through an international strait.596
The NSRs specify equipment, charts, and publications that all covered
vessels must carry. They also establish requirements for testing equipment
before entering port or getting underway, vessel operating requirements for
vessels underway and at anchor, and a requirement for master-pilot
conferences before beginning a transit. Additional requirements are estab-
lished specifically for tankers.597
The PWSA authorized the Coast Guard to prescribe minimum safety
equipment standards for structures in or immediately adjacent to the
navigable waters, 598 while preserving state authority to prescribe "higher
safety equipment requirements or safety standards" than those established by
the Coast Guard.599 The Act limits the states' authority to prescribe more
stringent standards to "structures only. ' 600 Title I applies equally to United
States and foreign vessels; however, it does not supplant or modify any
treaty or any other federal statutes. 601
Congress announced in Title II of the PWSA that existing standards for
the design, construction, and operation of all United States tank vessels and
foreign tank vessels entering United States waters needed to be improved to
ensure adequate protection of the marine environment. 602 The Act therefore
593Under this authority the Coast Guard promulgated the General Ports and Waterways Safety
Regulations, 33 C.F.R. pt. 160.
59433 C.F.R. pt. 164; 42 Fed. Reg. 5956, 5962-65 (1977) (final rule). The rules are critically analyzed
in Mervin, Government Regulation of Oil Polluters: How Much is Enough?, 29 Admin. L. Rev. 603
(1977). The vessel operating and equipment requirements were codified at 46 C.F.R. pts. 32, 35, 77, 78,
96, 97, 167, 184, 185, 195 & 196.
595An exception is made for foreign vessels that are transiting through the navigable waters, but are
not destined for or departing from a United States port. 33 C.F.R. § 164.01.5961d. § 164.02.
597Id. § 164.13 & 164.39.598PWSA, supra note 587, tit. I § 101(7), 86 Stat. at 425.5991d. § 102(b), 86 Stat. at 426.600The Supreme Court ruled that this limited saving clause preempts the states from prescribing more
stringent standards for vessels. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 174, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
6°'PWSA, supra note 587, tit. 1, § 102(b), 86 Stat. at 426.602Id. tit. II, § 201(1), 86 Stat. at 427.
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required the Coast Guard to promulgate regulations establishing standards
for the construction, design, equipment, and manning (the previously
mentioned "CDEM" standards) of such vessels and for their operation. 60 3
Rules established under Title II were not to be applied to foreign vessels
having on board valid inspection certificates recognized under laws or
treaties of the United States,60 4 and the Act expressly provided for reciprocal
recognition of certificates issued pursuant to treaties to which the United
States was party. 6° 5 The Act directs the Secretary to transmit any proposed rules
to the appropriate international forums for their consideration as international
standards. 6° 6 Finally, the Act granted the Secretary authority to deny entry into
United States navigable waters to any vessel not in compliance with the Act or
any regulations promulgated under authority of the Act.6° 7
2. The 1978 Port and Tanker Safety Act
In response to a series of tanker disasters in the latter half of the 1970s,
the President and Congress joined in a call for more stringent merchant
vessel safety and pollution prevention standards. 60 8 Despite their frustration
with the pace of international developments, both Congress and the
Executive Branch remained hopeful that international standards would be
tightened up sufficiently to ensure an adequate level of protection, thus
obviating the need to establish a separate regime for the United States.
President Carter "placed heavy emphasis on international negotiations as a
primary means of advancing" pollution prevention initiatives. 60 9 The State
Department observed that international standards "enable the United States
to avoid a conflicting patchwork of national standards that would impeded
the free flow of commerce. ' ' 610 Under directions of the President, the Coast
Guard representatives to the IMO "urged prompt action in improving
international standards on tanker construction equipment and operations and
6
°
3Id. § 201(3). The list of items to be addressed includes, inter alia, fittings, equipment, appliances,
propulsive machinery, auxiliary machinery, life saving and firefighting equipment, equipment for "the
prevention and mitigation of damages to the marine environment. Manning standards were to also
address 'the duties and qualifications of the officers and crew."' Id.
6
°41d. § 201(5), 86 Stat. at 429.
6 05 d. § 201(7)(D), 86 Stat. at 430.6 061d. § 201(7)(B), 86 Stat. at 430.
6 07 1d. § 201(13), 86 Stat. at 431.
6°8A summary of national and international measures is provided in the Coast Guard report on the
TSPP Conference, published at 43 Fed. Reg. 16,886-91; reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 541 (1978) and in the
legislative history for the PTSA. H.R. Rep No. 95-1384, supra note 435, pt. I, at 5-10, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3,274-77.
6 09H.R. Rep. No. 95-1384, supra note 435, at 8.6 10 1d. at 47 (Letter from Douglas J. Bennett, United States Department of State, to Representative John M.
Murphy, Chairman of the House Merchant Marine & Fisheries Committee, dated Sept. 13, 1977).
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on inspection practices." 611 In response to the urgings of the United States
(punctuated by a personal appearance of the Secretary of Transportation
before the IMO) an International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution
Prevention (TSPP) was held from February 6-17, 1978. The Secretary of
Transportation expressed his intention that the United States domestic
program would be consistent with the TSPP measures, noting that "the
worth of any domestic program for marine safety and environmental
protection, whether regulatory or legislative, must be measured not only in
terms of its immediate effectiveness, but also in terms of its ultimate impact
on international efforts toward the same goal." 61 2 The TSPP conferees
adopted protocols to enhance both the SOLAS and MARPOL conventions,
including new provisions for port State control; however, the 1978 SOLAS
Protocol was not scheduled to enter into force until 1981, and the 1978
MARPOL Protocol not until 1983. The STCW Convention was also adopted
in 1978, but would not enter into force until 1984. The Law of the Sea
Convention would not even be completed until 1982, and would not enter
into force until 1994.
Congress enacted the 1978 Port and Tanker Safety Act (PTSA) against
this backdrop of slowly developing international rules.613 Understandably,
the PTSA evinces Congress' impatience with the pace of the international
response to the growing threat of pollution by ships. Convinced that the
then-existing international standards failed to protect adequately the marine
environment, Congress directed the Coast Guard to study the international
scheme and report its findings to the Congress. At the same time, Congress
sanctioned a domestic regime for the United States that could include
standards that were more stringent than those established by the existing
international conventions. The legislative history makes it clear, however,
that Congress intended the vast majority of the standards to be those that
would be established by the new 1978 protocols and the STCW Convention
developed by the TSPP conferees. 614
61 ]Id.
612Id. at 35 (Letter from John Wofford, United States Department of Transportation, to Representative
John M. Murphy, Chairman of the House Merchant Marine & Fisheries Committee, dated May 11, 1978).
613 Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (1978).
6 14H.R. Rep. No. 95-1384, supra note 435, at 21 ("In general, the minimum standards to be required
are consistent with the internationally accepted standards agreed to by an overwhelming majority of the
delegations participating in the International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention held
in London in February 1978. ... To the extent feasible, the committee elected to endorse standards
internationally agreed to. However, it declined to await the ratification of any international agreement on
this subject and established specific dates on which certain standards would go into effect, whether or not
there is a final convention in force at the time of such effective dates."). The committee rejected the
charge that United States action under the PTSA constituted "bad faith" in our international relations. Id.
at 21-22.
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The PTSA enhanced the federal government's ports and waterways safety
regime in a number of important respects. Section 9 of the Act provided, for
the first time, authority for the Coast Guard to establish conditions of entry
into United States ports.615 Under the new authority the Coast Guard could
exclude vessels with a history of accidents or pollution incidents and those
which did not comply with the Act's manning requirements. Congress
further directed the Coast Guard to create and maintain a "marine safety
information system," (MSIS) to record information on vessels which could
be used in evaluating their safety history. 616
The PTSA further authorized and encouraged the President to enter into
international agreements relating to port and vessel safety. 617 More specif-
ically, the PTSA authorized the President to establish compatible vessel
standards and vessel traffic services with adjacent nations. Such agreements
may-on a reciprocal basis-waive application of United States design,
construction, operation, equipment, personnel qualifications, and manning
standards for vessels transiting United States waters en route to a port in the
adjacent nation. The PTSA also recognized the international law limits on
coastal State jurisdiction over foreign vessels. 618 Section 4 of the Act, which
authorizes the Secretary to promulgate "vessel operating requirements" for
vessels in United States navigable waters, expressly exempts foreign vessels
in innocent passage through the United States territorial sea or in transit
passage through an international strait within the navigable waters of the
United States, except where authorized by international treaty, convention,
or agreement. 619 The implementing regulations promulgated by the Coast
Guard include an identical exemption.620 Section 5 of the Act, which directs
the Secretary to establish construction, design, equipment, manning, person-
nel qualification, and operation requirements for tank vessels, similarly
exempts vessels in innocent passage or transit passage. 62'
The PTSA sections that amended Title II of the original PWSA are, like
their predecessor, addressed to "vessel construction, equipment, manning
6 15 PTSA, supra note 613, § 9, 92 Stat. 1476 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1228).
6 16The MSIS later became an important element in the Coast Guard's Port State Control program.6 17 PTSA, supra note 613, § 11, 92 Stat. 1477 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1230).618The concern of the Executive Branch that the freedoms of navigation recognized under
international law be preserved under the PTSA was forcefully articulated in the Act's legislative history.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1384, supra note 435, at 45-48 (Letter from Douglas J. Bennett, United States
Department of State, to Representative John M. Murphy, Chairman of the House Merchant Marine &
Fisheries Committee, dated Sept. 13, 1977).6 19 PTSA, supra note 613, § 4(d), 92 Stat. 1474 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1223(d)).
62°See supra note 596 and accompanying text.6 21PTSA, supra note 613, § 5(4), 92 Stat. at 1482 (originally codified at 46 U.S.C. § 391a, now at 46
U.S.C. § 3702(e)).
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and operational procedures. '622 The 1978 Act initially required the Coast
Guard to adopt vessel construction standards consistent with the "best
achievable technology" (BAT); however, Congress later deleted that re-
quirement. 623 The Act specified the minimum standards that the Secretary
was to establish for certain crude oil and product tankers, and gave the
Secretary the authority to exceed the congressionally mandated "minimum"
standards even if the Secretary's regulations exceeded internationally agreed
upon standards. 624 It grants the Secretary authority to require vessels to
install and use specified navigation equipment, communications equipment,
or any electronic or other device necessary to comply with the vessel traffic
service or which is necessary in the interest of vessel safety. 625 The PTSA
clarifies the Secretary's duty to consult with involved federal and state
officials. 626 The legislative history explains that the Act requires the
Secretary to identify and "reconcile" conflicting uses of the waterways. 6 27
The PTSA may serve as a basis for effectuating treaty provisions without
regard to whether the underlying treaty is self-executing. Under 33 U.S.C. §
1228(a)(2), the Secretary of Transportation is authorized to deny entry to a
vessel that fails to comply with any "applicable law or treaty." Section
1228(a)(5) similarly provides authority to deny entry to a vessel the officers
of which are licensed by a state which the Secretary has determined has
licensing standards which are not comparable to or more stringent than
United States' standards, or international rules and standards that are
accepted by the United States. 628 Under either provision, the Secretary has
discretion to enforce treaties without regard to whether they are self-
622pTSA, supra note 613, § 5(I)(B), 92 Stat. at 1480; id. § 2(c)(3), 92 Stat. 1471.
623 PTSA, supra note 613, § 5(l)(D), 92 Stat. at 1480 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 391a(5)), repealed by
the partial revision of Title 46, United States Code, Shipping, Pub. L. No. 98-84, 97 Stat. 500, 599-600,
605 (1983)). By contrast, the Washington state tanker standards under challenge in Intertanko v. Locke
call for the "best achievable protection." 947 F. Supp. 1484, 1488, 1997 AMC 512 (W.D. Wash. 1996)
(citing Wash. Admin. Code §§ 317-21-200 to -265).624 PTSA, supra note 613, § 5(6)(A), 92 Stat. at 1483. In its 1990 report on Crew Size and Maritime
Safety, the National Research Council concluded that:
While the Coast Guard has the authority to examine manning levels for foreign vessels entering
U.S. waters and take exception where appropriate, a more pragmatic approach would be to address
this issue internationally. Current international agreements already contain certain accepted
principles of safe manning. What is needed is an internationally accepted analytical method for
establishing and assessing minimum safe manning. The United States should develop such a
method for use domestically and propose it at IMO for international acceptance.
National Research Council, Crew Size and Maritime Safety 83 (1990).
625 PTSA, supra note 613, § 4(a)(3), 92 Stat. at 1472 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(3); see also 46
U.S.C. § 3708). The Act requires tank vessels in United States waters to at all times have at least one
officer on the bridge capable of clearly understanding English. 33 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(7).
626 PTSA, supra note 613, § 12(b), 92 Stat. at 1480 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1224(b)); see also 46
U.S.C. § 3703(c).62 7H.R. Rep. No. 95-1384, supra note 435, at 13.62 8The Secretary is required to evaluate the licensing standards of other nations by 46 U.S.C. § 9101.
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executing or have been implemented by domestic statutes. In any event, the
PTSA largely answered the question whether any given IMO treaty is
self-executing. The Act facilitates consistency with later-enacted interna-
tional developments by authorizing the Secretary to modify any regulation
or standard prescribed under § 5 of the PWSA "to conform to the provisions
of an international treaty, convention, agreement or an amendment that is
ratified by the United States." 629 Thus, later developments in international
standards may, in some circumstances, be incorporated into United States
law without further legislation, as soon as the United States ratifies the treaty
or amendment.
3. State Consultation and Preemption Provisions
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. the Supreme Court observed that under
the PWSA, federal law controls navigation in the United States navigable
waters in major respects. 630 Nevertheless, before promulgating vessel
operating requirement regulations or vessel construction, design, equipment,
or manning requirements for tank vessels under authority of the PTSA, the
Secretary is required to consult with representatives of the maritime
community, port and harbor authorities, and environmental groups. 631 Under
§ 5 of the Act the Secretary must also establish procedures for consulting
with and receiving and considering the views of any affected states and
parties in the exercise of the Secretary's regulatory authority under the
Act. 632 The Act thus gives states and the interested maritime community an
important role in developing vessel operating regulations to implement the
Act.
Under the PWSA, states may enact higher equipment safety standards for
structures, but not for vessels. The Court held in Ray that the Act impliedly
forbids higher state equipment or safety standards for vessels. 633 That
section of the Act, the Court concluded, prevents a state from issuing "higher
safety equipment requirements or safety standards" with respect to those
requirements "which may be prescribed pursuant to this chapter." 634 The
state of Washington had argued that the preclusive effect of 33 U.S.C.
629 PTSA, supra note 613, § 5(12), 92 Stat. at 1489; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-1384, supra note 435,
at 26.
630435 U.S. 151, 154, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
63133 U.S.C. § 1224(b); 46 U.S.C. § 3703(c). The consultation requirement is contained both in § 2
of the PTSA, which addresses vessel operating requirements, and § 5, which addresses vessel CDEM
requirements.
63233 U.S.C. § 1231; see General Accounting Office, Environmental Challenges Require a Better
Working Relationship (TD171.A655 1995) (1995).
633435 U.S. at 174. The current provision is codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1222(b).
634435 U.S. at 171.
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§ 1222(b) was limited to "vessel equipment requirements." 635 But the
Supreme Court rejected the argument and held that the statute "expressly
reaches 'safety standards"' as well as equipment. 636 Thus, once the
Secretary has established a safety equipment or safety standard, or deter-
mined that no such requirement should be imposed at all, the state is no
longer free to impose a standard of its own. 637 The statutory language and
legislative history of the PWSA is silent on whether Congress intended to
occupy the rest of the field of ports and waterways safety (other than safety
equipment or standards).
The Court in Ray also held that the PWSA and PTSA "subjects to federal
rule the design and operating characteristics of oil tankers. '638 The Court
observed that the statutory pattern of the Act demonstrates that Congress
intended uniform national standards for design and construction of tankers
that foreclose the imposition of different or more stringent state require-
ments.639 The Court then concluded that:
Congress did not anticipate that a vessel found to be in compliance with the
Secretary's design and construction regulations and holding a Secretary's
permit, or its equivalent, to carry the relevant cargo would nevertheless be
barred by state law from operating in the navigable waters of the United States
on the ground that its design characteristics constitute an undue hazard.640
In reaching its conclusion the Court found it significant that the Secretary
was required to promulgate regulations implementing Title II of the Act,64 1
but that no similar mandatory duty was imposed under Title I of the Act.642
D. The Clean Water Act and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
Federal water pollution prevention and control statutes, which date from
as early as 1899, are among the oldest of the nation's environmental laws. 643
6351d. at 174.6361d. (emphasis added).
6371d. at 171-72.
6381d. The Supreme Court has also found an "evident congressional purpose to establish a uniform
federal regime controlling the design of oil tankers." Id. at 165-66.6391d. at 163. "Congress anticipated the enforcement of federal standards that would pre-empt state
efforts to mandate different or higher design requirements." Id. at 165-66.
640 Id. at 163-64.
641Originally codified at 46 U.S.C. § 391 a; now codified at 46 U.S.C. § 3703.
642435 U.S. at 171.643The modem Clean Water Act has its roots in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1121;
the Oil Pollution Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 604; and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948
(FWPCA), 62 Stat 1155. The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 (WQIA), Pub. L. No. 91-224, 81
Stat. 91, 84 Stat. 1161 (1970), passed partly in reaction to the oil spill from the Torrey Canyon, amended
the 1948 FWPCA and repealed the Oil Pollution Act of 1924. See H. Rep No. 91-127, reprinted in 1971
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The evolution of the principal federal statutes and regulations has been
comprehensively described by others. 64 This section of the article will focus
on those provisions in the relevant statutes that may be relevant to the federal
and state roles in preventing vessel-source pollution and the relevant
provisions saving or preempting state authority over that subject.
1. Federalism Under the Clean Water Act
Protection of United States waters from pollution has been the goal of a
series of federal acts that have been mostly consolidated into the Clean
Water Act (CWA).645 The CWA addresses a variety of water pollution
problems, both by type of pollutant and source. The Act regulates the
discharge of oil, hazardous substances, 646 sewage, and thermal pollutants.
The CWA also establishes pollution prevention647 and response require-
ments, a mandate for national contingency planning, spiller liability and
financial responsibility requirements, discharge prohibitions, and penalties
for violations of the Act.
As with the PWSA, Congress, in drafting the CWA, sought to avoid any
conflict with international law. The Act expressly states that it shall not be
construed as affecting or impairing any treaty of the United States. 648 In
1980, the CWA was amended to make clear that discharges permitted under
the 1978 MARPOL Protocol are exempt from the CWA discharge prohibi-
tions.649 In addition, the Act now requires that any regulations issued under
the discharge prohibition section of the CWA be consistent with maritime
safety and with marine and navigation laws and regulations. 650
The geographic reach of CWA jurisdiction is coextensive with the federal
power over commerce, 651 and therefore extends even to waters which would
not be deemed "navigable" in determining the applicability of the PWSA or
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2691, 2692. The WQIA was in turn superseded by the 1972 FWPCA, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816, and the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.644See generally 2 W. Rodgers, Environmental Law ch. 4 (1986). For a history of the earlier acts see
Healy & Paulsen, Maritime Oil Pollution and The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 1 J. Mar. L.
& Com. 537 (1970).
64533 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1356.6
"6The release of hazardous substances into navigable waters is now largely regulated under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
64733 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(1)(C); 33 C.F.R. pts. 154-56 (Coast Guard pollution prevention regulations).
64833 U.S.C. § 1371(a).
649Act to Prevent Pollution by Ships, Pub. L. No. 96-478, 94 Stat. 2297 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(b)(3)).6501d. Such regulations must also be consistent with applicable water quality standards.65 1See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975); United States v. Holland, 373 F.
Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974); 2 Rodgers, supra note 644, at § 4.12.
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Title 46 of the United States Code.652 It is therefore not surprising that, in
enacting the CWA, Congress declared its intent to "protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution. '653 Consistent with that policy, Congress included in the Act a
saving clause preserving state prescriptive and enforcement authority
respecting discharges of pollutants or respecting the control or abatement of
pollution of state waters, so long as the state standards are at least as
stringent as federal standards.654 The Act also expressly declines to preempt
the states from imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the
discharge of oil or hazardous substances into state waters, 655 or with respect
to any removal activities related to such discharge. 656 Although the congres-
sional intent in declining to preempt state liability regimes is for the most
part clear, neither the Act nor its legislative history provides satisfactory
guidance on what Congress intended in declining to preempt state require-
ments. One prominent subject removed from state jurisdiction was the
regulation of the discharge of vessel-generated sewage.657
The preemptive effect of the state law saving provision which now
appears in the CWA was examined briefly by the Supreme Court in Askew
v. American Waterways Operators, Inc. 658 In 1971, shortly after enactment
of the predecessor Water Quality Improvement Act, a three judge district
court panel struck down the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution
Control Act on preemption grounds. 659 The Florida Act under challenge
6 52Compare 33 C.F.R. § 2.05-25(a) (defining "navigable waters of the United States" for laws other
than the CWA) with id. § 2.05-25(b) (defining "navigable waters of the United States" for purposes of
enforcing the CWA). The latter includes all waters "tributary to" the waters defined under § 2.05-25(a)
and all "other waters over which the Federal Government may exercise Constitutional authority."
65333 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
6541d. § 1370.
6551d. § 1321(o)(2). The clause originated in § I (o)(2) of the WQIA ("Nothing in this section shall
be construed as preempting any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirement or
liability with respect to the discharge of oil into any waters within such State."). The clause was carried
forward into the 1972 FWPCA, which added "hazardous substances" to "oil." 86 Stat. 870, § 311 (o)(2)
(1972).656The provision respecting removal activities was added by § 4202(c) of the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 523 (1990).657Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 312(f)(1), 86 Stat. 816, 872 (1972).
658411 U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1973). The Court's decision is actually based on the earlier version
of the current § 1321 (o) non-preemption clause that was contained in the WQIA. See supra note 655. The
Court has also held that the CWA preempts the federal common law of nuisance in interstate waters, City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), and, together with the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act, in ocean waters. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1 (1981). The Act does not, however, preempt state common law nuisance claims, if liability
is determined under the law of the source state. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).659 American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241, 1972 AMC 91 (M.D. Fla.
1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1973). The Florida statute was codified at Fla. Stat. ch.
70-244 (1970).
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applied to facilities within the state and to vessels destined for or departing
from such facilities. 660 It did not purport to apply to vessels in innocent
passage through Florida waters. In the direct appeal to the Supreme Court,
both the Maritime Law Association of the United States and the American
Bar Association filed amicus curiae briefs urging the Court to affirm the
decision below. 661 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed. Writing for
the Court, Justice Douglas, in an opinion described by Professors Gilmore
and Black as "bland" and one giving "the impression as having been written
with great care so as to commit the uncharacteristically unanimous Justices
to as little as possible," 662 held that the Florida Act's liability provisions
were not unconstitutional per se. The Court found that the Florida Act
addressed oil spill liability for damage to state or private property, while the
federal WQIA dealt only with cleanup costs incurred by the federal
government. Because the two acts focused on different subjects, the Court
concluded that there could be no conflict between them.663 The Court limited
its holding, however, stating that "[i]t is sufficient for this day to hold that
there is room for state action in cleaning up the waters of a State and
recouping, at least within federal limits so far as vessels are concerned, her
CoStS." 6 64
2. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
During the one year period from March 1989 to February 1990, the United
States suffered a series of major vessel-source marine pollution incidents
which blackened the waters and coastal shorelines in Alaska,665 Rhode
Island,666 Texas, 667 Delaware, 668 and California.669 The congressional re-
sponse was uncharacteristically prompt. A number of bills, some of which
66041, U.S. at 327.
661G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 831 n.13bb (2d ed. 1975).
6621d. at 831.
6 63Askew, 411 U.S. at 335-36.
661d. at 332.
665The TN Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound on March 24, 1989,
spilling nearly 11 million gallons of crude oil. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1990, at A-14, col. 4; see also H. Rep.
No. 101-242, pt. 3, at 5, 9-10 (1989) (describing spills leading up to OPA 90).
666On June 23, 1989 the TN World Prodigy ran aground in Narragansett Bay near Newport, Rhode
Island, spilling 280,000 gallons of heating oil. Id.667A tug-driven barge collided with another vessel in the Houston Ship Channel near La Porte, Texas,
on June 23, 1990 spilling 250,000 gallons of crude oil. Id.
6680n June 24, 1989 the Uruguayan TN Presidente Rivera ran aground in the Delaware River near
Claymont, Delaware, spilling 300,000 gallons of industrial heating oil. Id.669The TN American Trader holed herself on her own anchor on February 11, 1990, spilling
approximately 400,000 gallons of crude oil off Huntington Beach, California. Casuso, Workers Try to
Sweep Oil Off of California Beach, Chi. Trib., Feb. 11, 1990, at 10C.
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were introduced just a month before the Exxon Valdez oil spill, competed for
attention in the 101st Congress.670 A unanimous Congress eventually passed
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) on August 18, 1990.671 Far from a
"single purpose" work of legislation, OPA 90 comprises eighty sections
spanning nine chapters.
a. The OPA 90 Pollution Prevention Measures
It is well known that OPA 90 vastly increased both the scope and limits
of spiller liability and the potential civil and criminal penalties spillers may
face.672 But, more than that, OPA 90, like the PWSA, evinces a preference
for spill prevention over response and compensation. As a result, the drafters
included a number of provisions amending Title 46 of the United States
Code. For example, § 4115 established a phased-in requirement for double
hulls on tankers. 673 Significantly, the double hull requirement does not apply
to foreign vessels in innocent passage in the United States territorial sea or
in the EEZ.674 Section 4101 established new drug and alcohol testing
requirements for licensed or documented mariners. 675 As implemented by
the Coast Guard, this requirement has been similarly limited in its applica-
tion to foreign vessels and to United States vessels while in foreign waters,
670 0n March 16, 1989, Representative Walter Jones, Chairman of the House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee, introduced H.R. 1465, the Oil Pollution Prevention, Removal and Compensation
Act, which passed the House on November 9, 1989. On April 4, 1989, Senator George Mitchell
introduced S. 686, the Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act, which passed the Senate on August
4, 1989. Differences between the two bills were resolved by a Conference Committee during the summer
of 1990.671Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484. The compromise bill passed both houses with unanimous
votes. See 136 Cong. Rec. S 11547 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. H6949 (daily ed. Aug. 2,
1990). President Bush signed the bill into law on August 18, 1990. See 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 484. The
Conference Committee Report on the substitute bill, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 653 (1990), is reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 779.672See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702 (elements of liability), 2704 (limits of liability), and 1319 (civil and
criminal penalties). In enacting OPA 90, Congress rejected the liability scheme established by the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) and the International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution (Fund
Convention), supra note 415.673Codified at 46 U.S.C. § 3703a. See Alcock, "Ecology Tankers" and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990:
A History of Efforts to Require Double Hulls on Oil Tankers, 19 Ecology L.Q. 97 (1992). A ready
comparison of the OPA 90 double hull requirements and the requirements adopted by the IMO is
reproduced in Double-Hull Tanker Legislation, supra note 542, tables 2-2 & 2-3.
67446 U.S.C. § 3702(e). The exemption from such a design and construction requirement is consistent
with Article 21 of the LOS Convention (coastal State shall not enforce construction, design, equipment,
or manning requirements to vessels in innocent passage unless giving effect to generally accepted
international standards).67 5Codified at 46 U.S.C. § 7101.
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to avoid any conflict with foreign laws or policies. 676 Section 4106 requires
the Coast Guard to evaluate the manning standards for foreign flag tank
vessels. 677 Congress made it clear, however, that it did not intend that this
section would conflict with international comity or interfere with the right of
innocent passage. 678 Subsection 4106(a)(3) of the Act requires the Secretary
to deny entry to any foreign tanker the manning of which does not comply
with "standards equivalent to United States law" or "international standards
accepted by the United States." 679 The legislative history states that the
Secretary may consider the standards set by the STCW Convention in
making the determination. 680 Subsection 4106(b)(2) extends United States
marine casualty reporting requirements to foreign flag tank vessels in the
United States EEZ, "to the extent consistent with generally recognized
principles of international law." 681 Section 4109 directs the Secretary to
promulgate regulations establishing minimum hull plate thicknesses for
tankers. Section 4110 requires the Secretary to promulgate regulations for
tanker overfill devices and tank level or pressure monitoring devices. In both
cases, the Secretary's regulations are to be consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law. Section 4114 limits tanker crew
working hours to not more than fifteen hours in any 24-hour period and not
more than 35 hours in any 72 hours period. OPA 90 has been hailed as a
singular success. Since its enactment, the volume of oil pollution from
maritime sources in the United States has been reduced by 75%.682
b. The OPA 90 § 1018 Saving Clause: Requiem for Uniformity in
Merchant Vessel Regulations?
Courts and commentators disagree over the extent to which OPA 90 may
have amended federal and state authority to regulate vessel safety and
pollution prevention. Most would agree, however, that § 1018 of the Act and
its associated legislative history holds the answer. The Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee reported that preemption of state law was
"discussed by the Committee more than any other single issue" in drafting
67646 C.F.R. § 16.207.
6 77Codified at 46 U.S.C. § 9101(a).678H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, at 133 (1990).
679Codified at 46 U.S.C. § 9101(a)(2)(A).
680H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, at 132 (1990) ("The conferees intend that 'standards equivalent to
United States law' or 'international standards accepted in the United States' may be considered to include
the Convention on Standards for the Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers."). At the
time OPA 90 was enacted, the United States was not yet a party to the STCW Convention. Id.
"
t 1Codified at 46 U.S.C. § 6101(d).6 82Statement Accompanying Introduction of S.2009, 142 Cong. Rec. S9,428-05 (daily ed. Aug. 1,
1996).
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the OPA 90 legislation. 683 Preemption was, in fact, the principal point of
disagreement between the Senate and the House of Representatives. 684 It is
clear, however, that the preemption debate focused primarily on preemption
of state liability laws. The House bill (H.R. 1465) eventually passed, which
called for adoption of the international CLC and Fund oil spill liability
conventions, necessarily would have preempted state liability laws. Within
the Senate, however, majority leader George Mitchell announced early in the
legislative process that he would hold no hearings on any oil pollution bill
until the House passed a bill with no preemption statement in it.685 The
Senate bill (S. 686) eventually passed included a non-preemption clause that
is remarkably similar to the ones contained in earlier water pollution
statutes.686 Because the two houses eventually passed conflicting bills, the
issue of preemption (and others) was referred to the Conference Committee,
which negotiated for a year before reaching an agreement. The Conference
Substitute included two state law saving clauses. Section 1018(a), now
codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a), provides that:
Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall (1) affect, or be construed
or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any State or political subdivision
thereof from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to
(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State; or (2) any
removal activities in connection with such a discharge....
Similarly, Section 1018(c), codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718(c), provides that:
Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 or section 9509 of Title 26 shall
in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of the United States
or any State or political subdivision thereof (1) to impose additional liability
or additional requirements; or (2) to impose, or to determine the amount of,
any fine or penalty (whether criminal or civil in nature) for any violation of
law; relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge of oil.
6835. Rep. No. 101-94, at 17 (1989).
6 B4The legislative history can be found at: H. Rep. No. 101-200 (1990) (Committee on Merchant
Marine & Fisheries report on H.R. 2158); H.R. Rep. No. 101-241, pts. 1-I, at 132 (1990) (Committee
on Public Works & Transportation report on H.R. 3027); H.R. Rep No. 101-242, pts. I-V, at 132 (1990);
S. Rep. No. 101-94 (1990) (Committee on Environment & Public Works report on S. 686); S. Rep. No.
101-99 (1990) (Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation report on S. 1461); H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 101-653 (1990).
685134 Cong. Rec. S9689 (daily ed. July 14, 1988); see also Mitchell, Preservation of State and
Federal Authority Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 237 (1991); Jones, Oil Spill
Compensation and Liability Legislation: When Good Things Don't Happen to Good Bills, 19 Envtl. L.
Rep. 10,333 (1989).
686Both saving clauses originated in § 106 of Senate Bill 686, the "Oil Pollution Liability and
Compensation Act of 1989," which was developed by the Senate Environment & Public Works
Committee. 135 Cong. Rec. S9678 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989).
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In addition to the state law saving clauses eventually incorporated into §
1018 of OPA 90, Senate Bill 686 contained a second clause which would
have authorized states to regulate tanker safety. The second clause originated
in Senate Bill 1461 (the proposed Oil Tanker Navigation Safety Act of
1989).687 When Senate Bills 686 and 1461 were merged to form the
consolidated Senate bill eventually passed, many of the latter's provisions
were incorporated into title III of Senate Bill 686. The merged Senate Bill
686 (now in its third version) thus included two non-preemption clauses: one
set out in § 106, which largely mirrors § 1018 of the OPA 90, and another
at § 310, which would have permitted the states to regulate tanker safety.
The Conference Committee deleted § 310,688 however, after the House
conferees objected. In fact, the House conferees, apparently unsatisfied with
merely deleting § 310, inserted in the Conference Report an expression of
their understanding that the final conference substitute bill would not disturb
the Supreme Court's decision in Ray.6 8 9 The Conferees also included a
provision that saved the application of admiralty and maritime law. 690
Inspection of OPA 90 reveals that the terminology adopted by Congress
in § 1018 originated in the 1970 WQIA savings clause.691 In fact, the
6875. 1461, 101st Cong., § 112 (1989); see also S. Rep. No. 101-99 (1989). The original Senate Bill
1461 (Oil Tanker Navigation Safety Act of 1989), § 112 would have provided that:
Nothing in this legislation shall be construed or interpreted to affect in any way the authority of a
State or political subdivision to regulate oil tankers or to provide for liability or response planning
activities in state waters.
S. Rep. No. 101-99, supra note 684, at 21. Similarly, H.R. 2158 (Prince William Sound Oil Spill
Response Act) § 107 would have provided:
Nothing in this title shall be construed or interpreted as changing, diminishing, or preempting in any
way the authority of the State of Alaska, or any political subdivision thereof, to regulate oil tankers
or to provide for oil spill contingency response planning in state waters.
The House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee Report on H.R. 2158 (Prince William Sound Oil
Spill Response Act) reveals that:
This section does not provide any new authority to the State of Alaska or any of its political
subdivisions; it merely emphasizes that existing authority is not affected consistent with legal
precedent and court decisions.
Further, the Committee recognizes that the State of Alaska has imposed regulations on vessel
operators in state waters that are similar to the requirements of this Act. In exercising responsibility
under title I, the Secretary should examine those state regulations to ensure that, where possible, a
single standard is imposed on vessel owners and operators.
H.R. Rep. No. 101-200, at 9 (1989).
688See infra note 712 and accompanying text.
689H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, at 122 (1990).
69033 U.S.C. § 2751(e); National Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., 924 F.
Supp. 1436, 1996 AMC 2604 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd mem., 122 F.3d 1062, 1998 AMC 163 (4th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1301 (1998) (§ 2751 only preserves admiralty claims which are not
addressed in the Oil Pollution Act itself, such as a claim for collision damage).
69 1WQIA, 84 Stat. 91, § 1 1(o)(2) (1970) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed as pre-empting
any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the
discharge of oil into any waters within such State."). Section 1018 is also similar to the non-preemption
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operative phrase "requirement or liability" was carried forward, nearly
verbatim, from the WQIA, 692 through the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act and CWA amendments, and into OPA 90. The construction given to the
WQIA saving clause, both by Congress and by the Supreme Court in
Askew, 693 should therefore guide any analysis of OPA 90 § 1018. Section
1018 is also identical in all relevant respects to the state law saving clause
in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA). 694 Accordingly, whatever construction is given to § 1018
arguably should apply equally to CERCLA.
At the time the WQIA savings cjause was enacted, the only state water
pollution statutes to be "saved" focused on liability for spills. 695 The sparse
legislative history of the WQIA does little to indicate whether Congress had
anything in mind beyond oil spill response and liability when it passed the
WQIA. The Conference Report states that the WQIA saving clause
disclaims any intention of preempting any State or political subdivision from
imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the discharge of oil into
waters of that State. Thus, any State would be free to provide requirements and
penalties similar to those imposed by this section or additional requirements
and penalties. These, however, would be separate and independent from those
imposed by this section and would be enforced by the States through its
courts.
6 9 6
Although the Court in Askew 697 held that the Florida oil spill act's liability
provisions were not preempted per se by the WQIA, 698 the Court was less
certain about whether Florida's regulations requiring oil spill response
equipment was protected from preemption by the Act. Noting that resolution
of that question would depend on whether the subject required a uniform
provisions in several predecessor statutes addressed to pollution liability. See Deepwater Port Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1517(k)(1) (1988); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(9) (1988);
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1820(c) (1988).692See supra note 655.
693See supra notes 658-64 and accompanying text.
69442 U.S.C. § 9614(a): "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any
State from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous
substances in such State." See Funk, Federal and State Superfunds: Cooperative Federalism or Federal
Preemption, 16 Envtl. L. 1 (1985); Light, Federal Preemption, Federal Conscription Under the New
Superfund Act, 38 Mercer L. Rev. 643 (1987).695post, Private Compensation for Injuries Sustained by the Discharge of Oil From Vessels on the
Navigable Waters of the United States: A Survey, 4 J. Mar. L. & Com. 25, 50 (1972).696H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-940 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2691, 2727.
697Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1973).698Before the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was enacted, states could impose additional liabilities for
cleanup and removal, but state laws governing damages caused by spills were preempted. State of
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MA' Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1985 AMC 1521 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986).
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national rule and whether the Florida rule conflicted with rules promulgated
by the Coast Guard, the Court deferred the question. 699 The Court gave no
indication, however, that the WQIA saving clause would, in itself, permit the
state to promulgate requirements for vessels to carry oil spill containment
equipment (as additional state "requirements"). Nor does the Court's
opinion imply that the WQIA saving clause would insulate state statutes
enacting additional "liability" or other "requirements" from preemption by
statutes other than the WQIA. In fact, the Court recognized that state
liability requirements may be preempted by other federal statutes, most
notably the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act.7° °
Nothing in the Court's decision in Askew intimates a view that the WQIA
saving clause, which guards against preemption of state laws respecting
additional "liability" or "requirements," was addressed to anything other
than oil spill notification, financial responsibility requirements, liability, and
removal. Indeed, neither the State of Washington, in Ray,70 1 nor Alaska, in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond,70 2 relied upon the saving clause in the
WQIA (or its successor statutes) to defend the state's regulation of merchant
vessel safety or pollution prevention. In fact, while defending its ballast
water discharge prohibitions, the State of Alaska conceded that its laws
governing vessel safety, including those requiring navigation equipment,
twin radars, collision avoidance systems, and tug escorts, were preempted
under the Supreme Court's decision in Ray.70 3 In Ray, the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the CWA evinces a congressional intent to permit
states to regulate tanker design.7°4
The text and legislative history of OPA 90705 make it clear that Congress,
in enacting OPA 90, intended to permit states to enact pollution liability and
699Askew, 411 U.S. at 336-37.
70046 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-189. The Solicitor General had argued to the Court that the Florida Act was
preempted by the Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act. 411 U.S. at 331. The Court avoided the issue
by reasoning that Florida might construe its statute in a way that avoided the conflict. Id. The question
is now answered by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. See 33 U.S.C. § 2718.
701435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978).
7021978 AMC 1697 (D. Alaska 1978).
703Id. at 1701 ("Following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Company ... the defendants have stipulated with plaintiffs for entry of a partial summary
judgment and permanent injunction.").
704435 U.S. 151, 178 n.28, 1978 AMC 527 (1978) (rejecting argument that the CWA, the Coastal
Zone Management Act, or the Deep Water Port Act demonstrates Congressional intent for coexistent
regulation of tanker design).
705See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. S 11536-48 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (statements of Senate members in
support of H. Res. 452 to adopt the Conference Committee bill H.R. 1465); 136 Cong. Rec. H6920-33
& 6933-49 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statements of House members in support of H. Res. 452 to adopt
the Conference Committee bill H.R. 1465).
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response requirements more stringent than federal standards. 70 6 But there is
no support for the occasional comment that § 1018 expressly permits states
to enact their own oil pollution standards, or that § 1018 somehow disturbs
the rule in Ray.70 7 The Conference Report twice speaks of preserving
existing state authority. 70 8 The Conferees then cited a list of statutes that, by
virtue of OPA 90, no longer preempt state authority. 70 9 There is no
indication that the statute would disturb the preemptive effect of the PWSA,
Title 46 of the United States Code, or any the various international
conventions on merchant vessel safety or pollution prevention implemented
by the United States. The Conference Committee concluded its analysis of
§ 1018 by admonishing that "[t]he Conference substitute does not disturb the
Supreme Court's decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 435 U.S.
151 (1978)."710 Thus any construction of § 1018 should be limited not only
by interpretations given to its WQIA predecessor in Askew, but also by the
limitations on state authority identified by the Supreme Court in Ray.
Nothing in legislative history of § 1018 indicates that, in enacting the
Conference Substitute Bill, Congress intended by that Act to permit the
several states to regulate merchant vessel safety and vessel-source pollution
prevention. 71' On the contrary, Senator Stevens of Alaska acknowledged
that parts of his Oil Tanker Navigation Safety Bill (S. 1461) were "lost" in
7
°6In concluding that § 1018 affected only state competency with respect to oil spill liability, the court
in National Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1436, 1447-48,
1996 AMC 2604 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff'd mem., 122 F.3d 1062, 1998 AMC 163 (4th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1301 (1998), cited the Senate Report on the savings clause:
The theory behind the [savings clause] is that the Federal statute is designed to provide basic
protection for the environment and victims damaged by spills of oil. Any State wishing to impose
a greater degree of protection for its own resources and citizens is entitled to do so.
See also In re Jare Spray 11 K/S, 1997 AMC 845 (D.N.J. 1996) (construing the provisions with particular
emphasis on the "with respect to" clause).70 7See, e.g., Crick, The Washington State BAP Standards: A Case Study in Aggressive Tanker
Regulation, 27 J. Mar. L. & Com. 641, 641-42 (1996); Wyatt, Navigating the Limits of State Spill
Regulations: How Far Can They Go?, 8 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 1, 20 (1995) (concluding that OPA § 1018
"congressionally overruled" the Supreme Court's decision in Ray); Donaldson, The Texas Response to
Oil Pollution: Which Law to Apply, 25 St. Mary's L.J. 533 (1994); Ruhl & Jewell, Oil Pollution Act of
1990: Opening a New Era in Federal and Texas Regulation of Oil Spill Prevention, Containment and
Liability, 32 S. Tex. L. Rev. 475 (1991).7 0 For example, the Conference Committee noted that § 106 of S. 686 and § 1018 of H.R. 1465 "are
generally similar provisions preserving the authority of any State to impose its own requirements or
standards with respect to discharges of oil within that State."7
°9The listed acts include OPA 90 itself, § 9509 of the Internal Revenue Code, and the Shipowners'
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851.7 10H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, at 121-22 (1990). In expressly saving the Supreme Court's decision
in Ray, Congress has arguably accorded the Court's decision statutory status.7 111n enacting the PWSA, the House of Representatives wanted to make it clear that "State regulation
of vessels is not contemplated." Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 174, 1978 AMC 527 (1978)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 92-563, at 15 (1971)). House members on the OPA 90 Conference Committee
apparently still held those same reservations.
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the process which produced the Conference Substitute which ultimately
became OPA 90.712 Among the provisions "lost" in conference was § 310,
which would have authorized the states to regulate tanker safety. Statements
made in support of adoption of the Conference Substitute intimate no
intention to enlarge state authority to regulate vessel safety.71 3 In a
contemporaneous analysis of the Act, three members of the legislative
counsel for the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee similarly
concluded that the Conferees did not intend that federal jurisdiction over
vessel construction, manning, or licensing would be ceded to the states.
7 4
Any construction of § 1018 must also be consistent with existing
international law, including those IMO-sponsored conventions to which the
United States is party.715 Although Congress can, by subsequently-enacted
legislation, override the effect of an international agreement, the courts will
not infer such intent. Rather, such intent must be clearly expressed.
716
Nothing in § 1018 indicates an intent by Congress to affect United States
obligations under SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW, customary international law,
or any other merchant vessel safety or pollution prevention convention. As
the next part of this article will demonstrate, however, there exists wide-
spread confusion within the federal courts over the effect of § 1018.
712136 Cong. Rec. S11536, 11539 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (remarks of Sen. T. Stevens).
7 13See 136 Cong. Rec. H6920-32 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. SI 1536-48 (daily ed.
Aug. 2, 1990).7 14Wilkinson et al., Slick Work: An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, at 72-73 (paper
presented at the New Orleans Maritime Seminar on the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Jan. 10, 1991) (copy
on file with the author). When the authors published the article two years later the reference was deleted
without explanation. See Wilkinson et al., Slick Work: An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 12
J. Energy Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 181 (1992).7 15Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) ("[L]egislative silence is not sufficient to abrogate a
treaty.").7 16See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
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